Scholarship Repository
University of Minnesota Law School
Articles

Faculty Scholarship

2014

Who's Afraid of Good Governance? State Fiscal Crises, Public
Pension Underfunding, and the Resistance to Governance Reform
Thomas Fitzpatrick
Amy B. Monahan
University of Minnesota Law School, monahan@umn.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/faculty_articles
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Thomas Fitzpatrick and Amy B. Monahan, Who's Afraid of Good Governance? State Fiscal Crises, Public
Pension Underfunding, and the Resistance to Governance Reform, 66 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW 1317 (2014),
available at https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/faculty_articles/918.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been
accepted for inclusion in the Faculty Scholarship collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship
Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.

WHO’S AFRAID OF GOOD GOVERNANCE? STATE FISCAL
CRISES, PUBLIC PENSION UNDERFUNDING, AND THE
RESISTANCE TO GOVERNANCE REFORM
Thomas J. Fitzpatrick IV* & Amy B. Monahan**
Abstract
Much attention has been paid to the significant underfunding of
many state and local employee pension plans, as well as to efforts by
states and cities to alleviate that underfunding by modifying the benefits
provided to workers. Yet relatively little attention has been paid to the
systemic causes of such financial distress—such as chronic
underfunding that shifts financial burdens to future taxpayers, and
governance rules that may reduce the likelihood that a plan’s trustees
will make optimal investment decisions. This Article presents the
results of a qualitative study of the funding and governance provisions
of twelve public pension plans that are a mix of state and local plans of
various funding levels. We find that none of the plans in our study
satisfy the best practices that expert panels have established, and that
the strength of a plan’s governance provisions does not appear
correlated with a plan’s financial health. Our most important finding is
that, regardless of the content of a plan’s governance provisions, such
provisions are almost never effectively enforced. This lack of
enforcement, we theorize, has a significant, detrimental impact on plan
funding and governance. If neither plan participants nor state taxpayers
are able to effectively monitor and challenge a state’s inadequate
funding or improper investment decisions, public plans are very likely
to remain underfunded. This Article concludes by offering several
possible reform options to address the monitoring and enforcement
problems made clear by our study: automatic benefit reductions,
automatic tax increases, a low-risk investment requirement, and market
monitoring through the use of modified pension obligation bonds.

* Economist, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland. The views and opinions expressed in
this Article are the author’s alone, and do not necessarily reflect the views or opinions of the
Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, the Board of Governors, or other Banks in the Federal
Reserve System. I am grateful to O. Emre Ergungor and John Carlson of the Federal Reserve
Bank of Cleveland for their insight and guidance, and Moira Kearney-Marks for her valuable
research assistance.
** Julius E. Davis Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law School. I am grateful
to Claire Hill, John Langbein, Brett McDonnell, and Ron Snell for helpful comments on earlier
drafts of this Article, and to Martha Kramer for the excellent research assistance she provided.
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INTRODUCTION
The massive underfunding of state and local retirement plans affects
not only the financial security of covered employees but also the ability
of state and local governments to meet the basic needs of its citizens.
The State of Illinois, for example, has seen its credit rating downgraded
to the lowest level of any U.S. state because of its considerable
unfunded pension liabilities.1 In the City of Philadelphia, it has been
said that “[t]here is no single greater drain on the city’s capacity—to
fight crime, to fund education, to clean the streets or to cut taxes—than
pensions.”2 These types of problems are not isolated. Public pension
plans cover over twenty-seven million state and local employees,3 and
many have significant unfunded liabilities.4 As the State Budget Crisis
Task Force recently detailed, these plans are placing increasing pressure
on budgets, as governments struggle with the trade-offs that must be
made between funding pensions and providing governmental services.5
Much attention has been paid to the ability of state and local
governments to address plan underfunding ex post by reducing benefits
provided to employees, thereby reducing a plan’s liabilities. This Article
seeks to move the debate in a new direction by focusing on public
1. S&P Downgrades Illinois to A-, Citing Pension Inaction, CHI. TRIB. (Jan. 25, 2013),
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2013-01-25/business/chi-sp-downgrades-illinois-to-aminusciting-pension-inaction-20130125_1_action-on-pension-reform-downgrades-negative-outlook.
2. Patrick Kerkstra, Moral Hazards: Philadelphia’s Ongoing Pension Crisis, PHILA.
MAG. (Apr. 27, 2012), http://www.phillymag.com/articles/philadelphias-ongoing-pension-crisis.
3. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-322, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT
PENSION PLANS: ECONOMIC DOWNTURN SPURS EFFORTS TO ADDRESS COST AND SUSTAINABILITY
1 (2012), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/590/589043.pdf.
4. See id. at 12–15 (noting that plans are facing a growing gap between assets and
liabilities); PEW CENTER ON THE STATES, THE WIDENING GAP UPDATE 5–6 (2012), available
at http://www.pewstates.org/uploadedFiles/PCS_Assets/2012/Pew_Pensions_Update.pdf
(illustrating the increase and decrease in each individual state’s unfunded retiree health care
liabilities).
5. For an overview of the fiscal pressures facing states, see RICHARD RAVITCH & PAUL A.
VOLCKER, REPORT OF THE STATE BUDGET CRISIS TASK FORCE 3 (2012), available at
http://www.statebudgetcrisis.org/wpcms/wp-content/images/Report-of-the-State-Budget-CrisisTask-Force-Full.pdf.
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pension plan governance—that is, the rules and regulations that apply to
plan funding and investments. Examining the challenges of public
pension plan governance is critical to understanding how systemic
underfunding should be best addressed going forward, and must be a
key piece of any comprehensive reform of such plans.6
To be financially sound, a pension plan must be adequately funded
on an annual basis, and the plan’s assets must be managed and invested
in a sound manner. Ensuring that a plan is adequately funded on an
annual basis is difficult because funding decisions are often left to
political actors, who may rationally seek to delay funding or understate
actual funding needs because they prefer to use available revenue to
secure current political gain rather than financially sound pension
benefits payable decades in the future. And once funds have been
transferred to a public pension plan, political pressures are again likely
to impact investment decisions. According to basic trust principles, the
assets of public pension plans have been set aside for the sole purpose
of providing plan benefits to eligible retirees.7 However, control of
these assets is often in the hands of political actors whose short-term
political interests may be very different than future retirees’ interests.8
Imagine, for example, that you are an elected state official who sits on
your state’s pension board. While the state is struggling to make
budgetary ends meet, the pension plan has significant assets it is looking
to invest. You may be very tempted to invest those assets within the
state in a way that creates current jobs within the state, rather than
pursue an investment strategy that is focused solely on achieving the
desired mix of risk and return to safeguard retiree benefits. Indeed, the
governance provisions of some plans require this type of economically
targeted investing. In this context, it is easy to see why public pension
boards might make less than optimal investment decisions.
Mismatched incentives, however, are not the only problem.
Additionally, those who are harmed by underfunding or poor
investment decisions either do not monitor such actions or would be
unable to show any cognizable harm in court if they did effectively
monitor such decisions. An employee or retiree, who has a direct
interest in the fund’s assets, is primarily interested in whether the fund
has sufficient assets to pay his or her benefits. As a result, as long as the
6. We wish to note that governance is a key element of any reform of public pension
plans, regardless of the form such reform takes. Governance is relevant to wholesale redesigns
of such plans, as well as to reforms aimed at retaining and strengthening existing plans.
7. See, e.g., John H. Langbein & Richard A. Posner, Social Investing and the Law of
Trusts, 79 MICH. L. REV. 72, 100–02 (1980) (discussing the Teachers’ Retirement System, a
public employee pension fund that was not “fully funded”).
8. This problem is not unique to public pensions, but occurs generally with respect to
state spending. See David A. Skeel Jr., States of Bankruptcy, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 677, 690–92
(2012) (noting the conflict of interests of lawmakers and constituents and how it affects state
spending decisions).

2014]

WHO’S AFRAID OF GOOD GOVERNANCE?

1321

fund has sufficient assets to pay the individual’s benefits, that individual
is uninterested in making sure that the financing burden is fairly
distributed over time, or in maximizing fund investment returns. Even
for a young employee who is decades away from retirement, the
incentive to monitor pension plan funding trustee decision-making is
fairly small. After all, if the plan is systemically underfunded or trustees
make poor investment decisions, the result often is simply that future
taxpayers will have to contribute additional amounts to the plan.9 The
harm to a young employee participating in an underfunded pension plan
seems distant and tenuous. And that brings us to taxpayers, who are the
“ultimate guarantors” of public pension funds.10 Future taxpayers are
perhaps most directly at risk from underfunding and poor investing, but
this poses yet another monitoring problem. How are future taxpayers to
effectively enforce good governance, when they do not yet exist and the
exact extent of the harm is unknown?
Despite the structural problems inherent in public plan governance,
comprehensive studies of the issue are lacking. Rather, prior governance
studies have tended to focus on discrete issues, such as the relationship
between social or economically targeted investing provisions and rate of
return,11 or the role of public plans as lead plaintiffs in securities class
action lawsuits.12 Two distinct expert bodies have, however, issued
recommendations and best practices aimed at improving public plan
governance. In the late 1990s, one of these bodies, the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL),
tackled public plan governance and issued a model law focused on
trustees’ fiduciary duties and the need for public disclosure.13

9. KATELIN P. ISAACS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 98-810, FEDERAL EMPLOYEES’
RETIREMENT SYSTEM: BENEFITS AND FINANCING
10
(2012),
available
at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/98-810.pdf; see Mark Daniels, Pensions in Peril: Single
Employer Pension Plan Terminations in the Context of Corporate Bankruptcies, 9 HOFSTRA
LAB. & EMP. L.J. 25, 110 (1991) (“In light of [an unfunded pension plan] bailout, it would not
take great imagination to envision a public bailout of the pension plan deficit by shifting the
burden to taxpayers.”).
10. ISAACS, supra note 9.
11. See, e.g., Julia L. Coronado et al., Public Funds and Private Capital Markets: The
Investment Practices and Performance of State and Local Pension Funds, 56 NAT’L TAX J. 579,
587 (2003) (discussing the relationship between ETI programs and rate of returns); David Hess,
Protecting and Politicizing Public Pension Fund Assets: Empirical Evidence on the Effects of
Governance Structures and Practices, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 187, 203–04 (2005) (discussing
the relationship between fiscal stress and rate of returns); Roberta Romano, Public Pension
Fund Activism in Corporate Governance Reconsidered, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 795, 828–29 (1993)
(discussing the relationship between social investing and fund performance).
12. David H. Webber, Is “Pay-to-Play” Driving Public Pension Fund Activism in
Securities Class Actions? An Empirical Study, 90 B.U. L. REV. 2031, 2033 (2010).
13. UNIF. MGMT. OF PUB. EMP. RET. SYS. ACT (1997), available at
http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/management_public_employee_retirement_systems/m
persa_final_97.pdf.
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Interestingly, only two states have adopted the model act.14 Ten years
later, the Stanford Institutional Investors’ Forum published best
practices for pension plan governance and this, too, has largely failed to
change plan practices.15 Given an apparently strong consensus that
public plan governance is flawed and in need of reform, it is puzzling
why previous reform efforts have been unsuccessful.
Our current study attempts to provide more comprehensive
information on the state of public plan governance than is currently
available in order to better understand its challenges. After providing
background on state and local pension plans in Part I, Part II examines
the governance provisions of twelve state and local plans. In particular,
it examines the ways in which the plans studied differ from the various
expert recommendations regarding plan governance, and from each
other. In addition, this Article focuses on how the governance
provisions that are in place are enforced. Our results show that nearly all
plans studied differ materially from the best practices recommended by
expert groups, and that there is no clear correlation between a plan’s
governance provisions and its funded status. Our study also illustrates
important differences between state and local plans, suggesting that
local plans are in even greater need of governance reforms than their
state-level counterparts. Perhaps most importantly, this Article shows
that regardless of the content of a plan’s governance provisions, there is
nearly no effective enforcement of plan governance by any of the
relevant stakeholders. The Article concludes in Part III by proposing
various reforms that could help solve the enforcement problem we have
identified. These reforms would give stakeholders a true incentive to
monitor both contributions to a plan and also the investment decisions
that are made with respect to plan assets.
I. BACKGROUND ON STATE AND LOCAL PENSION PLANS
There are over 3,400 pension plans that cover state and local
employees.16 Even by conservative estimates, these plans are
underfunded by more than $750 billion.17 Other estimates paint an even
bleaker financial picture, estimating unfunded liability for such plans as

14. The two states that have adopted the Model Act are Maryland and Wyoming. See
NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS, MANAGEMENT OF PUBLIC EMPLOYEE
RETIREMENT SYSTEMS ACT ENACTMENT STATUS MAP (2013) [hereinafter ENACTMENT STATUS
MAP], available at http://uniformlaws.org/Act.aspx?title=Management%20of%20Public%20
Employee%20Retirement%20Systems%20Act.
15. STANFORD INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR’S FORUM, COMMITTEE ON FUND GOVERNANCE
BEST PRACTICE PRINCIPLES (2007) [hereinafter CLAPMAN REPORT], available at
http://pebc.ca.gov/images/files/071113_ Principles.pdf.
16. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 3, at 4.
17. PEW CENTER ON THE STATES, supra note 4, at 4.
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high as $5 trillion.18 Despite being underfunded, these plans control an
enormous amount of assets—$2.4 trillion—even after the financial
market downturn in 2008.19 This Part explores the unique issues
involved in determining the rules by which these assets are contributed
and invested.
A. Funding Public Pension Plans
This Article focuses on defined benefit pension plans, which raise
unique funding issues. A defined benefit pension plan is one that
guarantees the benefit amount to be paid to the participant, generally
based on a formula that takes into account final salary and years of
service.20 The default form of benefit from such plans is a life annuity,
which provides a fixed monthly benefit payment for as long as the
participant lives.21 If the plan lacks sufficient assets to pay benefits,
whether because contribution levels were too low or investment results
were insufficient, the employer (here, the government) must make up
the shortfall.22 The participants and beneficiaries do not bear the
investment risk associated with such plans.
Funding defined benefit plans is complicated. Generally speaking,
each year the employer and employees should contribute enough money
to the plan to cover both the cost of benefits earned during the year, and
also a share of the plan’s unfunded liability, if any, that occurs because
funding assumptions have proven to be inaccurate.23 When actuaries
calculate the annual contribution amount, they must do so using a
number of assumptions that may or may not be accurate.24 For example,
actuaries must make assumptions about how long plan participants will
live post-retirement, when participants will begin to receive benefits,
what salary growth will be like, average employee tenure, and the
expected rate of return on fund assets.25 It is easy to see how critical
these assumptions are to the financial success of a plan. For example, a
plan that assumes a 9% rate of return on fund assets will have to
contribute a lower amount each year than a plan that uses a 7% return. If
that investment assumption turns out to be inaccurate, the plan could be
significantly underfunded, even though the full annual contribution was
made each year.
18. Robert Novy-Marx & Joshua Rauh, The Crisis in Local Government Pensions in the
United States, in GROWING OLD: PAYING FOR RETIREMENT AND INSTITUTIONAL MONEY
MANAGEMENT AFTER THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 47, 48 (Yasuyuki Fuchita et al. eds., 2011).
19. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 3, at 36.
20. Edward A. Zelinsky, The Cash Balance Controversy, 19 VA. TAX REV. 683, 687–88
(2000).
21. Id. at 687.
22. Id. at 692.
23. Jonathan Barry Forman, Funding Public Pension Plans, 42 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 837,
869 & nn.137–38 (2009).
24. Id. at 843.
25. Id.
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While plans often use different assumptions when calculating the
annual contribution that must be made, there is an additional
complicating factor with respect to how a plan’s future liabilities are
discounted to present value. Public plans use the plan’s expected rate of
return on its investments to discount plan liabilities.26 Financial
economists, however, argue that plan liabilities should be discounted
using a risk-free rate of return, a much lower figure than a plan’s
expected rate of return on investments.27 According to these economists,
public plans are significantly understating their liabilities and
overstating the plans’ funded status by using an unrealistically high
discount rate.28
Not only is it difficult to determine the correct rate of funding, but in
many states and municipalities there is no enforceable requirement to
actually make the “annual required contribution” (ARC).29 In many
states, the decision to fund the state pension plan is subject to the
legislative budgeting process.30 If legislators decide that other budgetary
needs have greater importance, the pension plan simply is not fully
funded. There are many reasons for legislators to avoid full pension
funding, one of which is the time inconsistency inherent in
intertemporal decision-making. That is, legislators may be likely to
underfund public pension plans because they mistakenly give current
needs greater weight than future needs. The personal discount rates
26. See id. at 863 (“[P]ublic pension plans typically use discount rates based on their own,
much higher investment return assumptions . . . .”).
27. Id. at 861–62.
28. See, e.g., Jeffrey R. Brown & David W. Wilcox, Discounting State and Local Pension
Liabilities, 99 AM. ECON. REV. 538, 538 (2009) (noting that state and local plans “generally
discount their pension liabilities using the assumed rate of return that the assets in the pension
trust are expected to earn”); Robert Novy-Marx & Joshua D. Rauh, Public Pension Promises:
How Big Are They and What Are They Worth?, 66 J. FIN. 1211, 1238 (2011) (explaining that the
liabilities that states report in their CAFRs does not accurately “reflect the risks of the plans’
future obligations from a taxpayer perspective”). The discount rate used by public plans is
higher than that used by private pension plans, which typically use the long-term corporate bond
rate for such purposes. Forman, supra note 23, at 862–63.
Recently the Government Accounting Standards Board approved Statement No. 68, which
slightly revises the discount rate public pension plans are allowed to use. To the extent that
plans are funded, they can continue to use their projected rate of return. But the unfunded
liability of pension plans will be changed to the yield on twenty-year, AA-rated municipal
bonds. Additionally, the change in net pension liability due to differences between the assumed
and realized investment returns must be recognized over a five-year period. Press Release,
Gov’t Accounting Standards Bd., GASB Improves Pension Accounting and Financial Reporting
Standards (June 25, 2012), available at http://www.gasb.org/cs/ContentServer?site=
GASB&c=GASBContent_C&pagename=GASB%2FGASBContent_C%2FGASBNewsPage&ci
d=1176160126951. While this will not have much of an impact on the funding status of wellfunded plans, it will result in underfunded plans reporting an even larger funding gap.
29. See PEW CENTER ON THE STATES, supra note 4, at 5 (showing that thirty-one states
failed to pay 100% of their required contribution for the 2010 fiscal year).
30. See Jack M. Beermann, The Public Pension Crisis, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 3, 4–5
(2013) (describing the legislative budgeting process for public pensions).
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people use to make decisions about future events change based on how
close that event is to the present.31 In particular, as costs or benefits
become closer to the present, people tend to discount them at much
lower rates than they use to discount events further in the future.32 This
phenomenon is well documented with respect to individuals making
retirement savings decisions,33 and it is likely that the same psychology
affects legislators making pension-funding decisions. As a result,
legislators may attempt to defer contributions to public pensions to
make room in state budgets for more immediate concerns. They may do
so even though it is apparent that the plan will require higher
contributions in the future, and then for similar reasons resist or attempt
to delay making the increased contributions that result.34 If the choice is
between funding current needs and funding pension benefits that will be
paid out in thirty years, it is easy to see why current needs might win
out. There is also, of course, a public choice aspect to the pension
funding dynamic. A legislator that has an interest in being reelected
would be wise to favor funding current needs that provide tangible
benefits to her constituents over funding future benefits for state
workers.
The problem with systemic underfunding, regardless of its precise
cause, is that it shifts the burden of paying for current benefits to future
taxpayers.35 It is essentially a form of off-balance sheet borrowing. The
31. See, e.g., R.H. Strotz, Myopia and Inconsistency in Dynamic Utility Maximization, 23
REV. ECON. STUD. 165, 167 (1955) (“The relative weight which a person may assign to the
satisfaction of a future act of consumption (the manner of discounting) may depend on . . . the
time distance of the future date from the present moment . . . .”); Richard H. Thaler, Some
Empirical Evidence on Dynamic Inconsistency, 8 ECON. LETTERS 201, 207 (1981) (testing the
hypothesis that discount rates change based on how close an event is to the present, and
concluding that “individual discount rates . . . tend to vary with the size and sign of the reward,
and the length of the delay”).
32. See generally CHOICE OVER TIME (George Lowenstein & John Elster eds., 1992)
(compiling several papers that explain and discuss the human tendency to devalue future
events).
33. See Shlomo Benartzi et al., Choice Architecture and Retirement Savings Plans, in THE
BEHAVIORAL FOUNDATIONS OF PUBLIC POLICY 245 (Eldar Shafir ed., 2012), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=999420 (using hyperbolic discounting in the design of a retirement
savings plan); David Laibson, Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting, 112 Q. J. ECON. 443
(1997) (defining hyperbolic discounting and arguing that it, along with increased liquidity in
financial markets, explains a decline in U.S. savings rates).
34. Potential examples of this phenomenon can be found in the sample states. For
example, during New York City’s fiscal crisis, the state pension decided to acquire risky bonds
of a finance intermediary supporting New York City at par instead of at the 20% discount they
were selling for in markets, and failing to make contributions to the retirement fund for years.
Tron v. Condello, 427 F. Supp. 1175, 1181 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). Another possible example of this
is the California Legislature’s decision to defer contributions and the subsequent conflict against
amortizing those contributions over a five-year period instead of a forty-year period. Bd. of
Admin. of the Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Wilson, 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d 207, 235–36 (Cal. Ct. App.
1997).
35. Hess, supra note 11, at 193.
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problem is compounded when the estimates that were used to calculate
the ARC turn out to be incorrect. Even if the government contributes the
ARC each year, if the assumptions used to calculate the ARC are
incorrect—for example if the plan fails to meet its assumed rate of
return—the burden of financing plan benefits shifts to future
taxpayers.36 Requiring future taxpayers to share in the cost of certain
governmental expenditures is not necessarily a bad thing. It may make
abundant sense when it comes to lasting capital investments that will
benefit those future taxpayers.37 It is harder, however, to justify
imposing the costs of current state consumption on future taxpayers
who will receive no corresponding benefit.38 Good governance rules,
which ensure that funding assumptions are reasonable, ARCs are made,
and that pension fund investment decisions are sound, help to ensure
that funding burdens are fairly distributed.
B. Pension Boards and Plan Investments
Typically, a board of trustees that is responsible for plan investment
and administration governs public plans.39 The make-up of such boards
varies significantly from plan to plan, but trustees typically come from
one of three groups: trustees who serve by virtue of their public office
(such as a state treasurer who automatically serves on the board),
trustees who are appointed by an elected official, and representatives of
plan beneficiaries, who are typically elected by current employees and
retirees.40 Very few plans require that trustees have any financial or
investment background or expertise.41
Given the political influence that is present on many boards, scholars
raise concerns that politicians are likely to interfere in board decisionmaking to secure political gain.42 Examples of board actions that appear
politically motivated include investments of fund assets in local
36. Id. at 192–93.
37. Anna Gelpern, Bankruptcy, Backwards: The Problem of Quasi-Sovereign Debt, 121
YALE L.J. 888, 907 (2012).
38. See id. (noting that sound capital investments will benefit future generations, but
borrowing for current consumption will not).
39. David Hess, Public Pensions and the Promise of Shareholder Activism for the Next
Frontier of Corporate Governance: Sustainable Economic Development, 2 VA. L. BUS. REV.
221, 239 (2007). One notable exception is the New York Common Retirement Fund, which the
State Comptroller manages as the sole trustee. Andria L. Bentley, The New York State
Comptroller as Sole Trustee of the Common Retirement Fund: A Constitutional Guarantee?, 72
ALB. L. REV. 761, 761 (2009).
40. Hess, supra note 11, at 195–97; Romano, supra note 11, at 800–01.
41. Webber, supra note 12, at 2064 (noting that prior research “demonstrates that board
members’ formal financial expertise does not correlate with fund performance”).
42. See, e.g., Hess, supra note 11, at 195–99 (“[M]ember-elected trustees have strong
incentives to perform their board-related duties, while politically affiliated trustees have
incentives to shirk and act opportunistically.”); Webber, supra note 12 (studying allegations that
public funds pursue securities class actions in return for campaign contributions from plaintiffs’
lawyers).
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economic activity and the selection of in-state investment managers.43 It
is easy to see how the long-term interests of public sector employees
may not match the short-term interests of political board members, who
may wish to trade local economic gain achieved through investing plan
assets in local firms for a lower rate of return.44
Several scholars draw on the robust literature regarding corporate
board performance in analyzing public pension boards. Corporate
boards typically have two types of members: inside directors who are
managers of the firm, and independent, outside directors.45 Outside
directors have been theorized to be more effective monitors of corporate
behavior than their inside counterparts, who may act in their own best
interests rather than the best interests of shareholders.46 Empirical
evidence regarding the impact of outside directors on firm performance
is, however, mixed.47
In applying corporate board research to the pension plan context,
independent plan trustees (those elected by plan beneficiaries) are
likened to outside directors.48 Independent plan trustees should help
monitor the political appointees. However, given that these elected
trustees are not truly independent but rather represent current workers
who are often unionized, these trustees may in fact have their own
agenda to pursue.49 Professor David Hess argues that because these
trustees have their personal retirement at stake, they may be more
comparable to inside directors with significant equity interests in the
firm.50 Given the fact that even poorly funded pension plans have
sufficient assets to pay benefits for many years in the future,51 it is
unclear how strong the analogy to corporate directors is. With public
funds, there is no real benefit to independent trustees in increasing the
fund’s performance, unlike corporate directors who directly benefit
from an uptick in stock price.
Several empirical studies have attempted to test whether the political
nature of public pension boards affects outcomes by examining the
relationship between board composition and a plan’s rate of return. As
an initial matter, one study found that public plans earn lower rates of
43. Hess, supra note 11, at 197.
44. Coronado et al., supra note 11, at 581.
45. Laura Lin, The Effectiveness of Outside Directors as a Corporate Governance
Mechanism: Theories and Evidence, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 898, 900 (1996).
46. Lisa M. Fairfax, The Elusive Quest for Director Independence, in RESEARCH
HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF CORPORATE LAW 170 (Claire A. Hill & Brett H. McDonnell
eds., 2012).
47. Id.
48. Hess, supra note 11, at 195–96.
49. Id. at 198.
50. Id.
51. Alicia H. Munnell et al., Center for Retirement Research at Boston College, Can State
and Local Pensions Muddle Through?, STATE & LOCAL PENSION PLANS (Center for Ret.
Research, Bos. Coll., Bos., Mass.), Mar. 2011, at 2, 3 & tbl.1, 8 app.B.
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return than their private pension counterparts, suggesting that public
pension boards may in fact be negatively affected by their political
nature.52 The results of more detailed studies examining the correlation
between board composition and rate of return, however, have been
mixed.53 One study found that political board members are positively
correlated with a fund’s rate of return,54 while two earlier studies found
the opposite to be true.55
However, board composition is not the whole story. Many boards
operate under investment rules that appear to prevent the
implementation of modern portfolio theory, which advocates for a
broadly diversified portfolio to minimize risk and maximize return.56
Historically, state and local pension plans were very conservative
investors.57 As recently as the 1990s, many public plans were prohibited
from or severely limited in making equity investments.58 That changed
in the 1990s as public plans saw equity investments as a way to help
solve plan underfunding.59
While equity investing is now commonplace, collective decisions
regarding where to invest assets that many consider to be “public” is
controversial. The tension here is caused in part by the fact that trust
52. See Coronado et al., supra note 11, at 587, 591, 592 tbl.9, 593 (finding that, after
controlling for equity allocation and plan size, public plans earned thirty-three basis points less
than private plans).
53. Hess, supra note 11, at 213, 222 tbl.2 (finding that political trustees had a positive
impact on performance, but elected trustees did not); Romano, supra note 11, at 826 tbl.3
(finding that elected trustees were positively correlated with investment return).
54. Hess, supra note 11, at 213, 222 tbl.2.
55. See Coronado et al., supra note 11, at 588 & tbl.5 (showing that “[a]rrangements
designed to insulate investment decisions from political interference appear to improve
returns”); Romano, supra note 11, at 825, 826 tbl.3 (showing that the higher the proportion of
independent board members to political board members, the higher the rate of return).
56. For a discussion of the concept of diversification in portfolio theory, see generally
Harvey E. Bines, Modern Portfolio Theory and Investment Management Law: Refinement of
Legal Doctrine, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 721 (1976). For an overview of modern portfolio theory,
including its treatment of the concept of diversification, see id. at 734–50.
57. Hess, supra note 11, at 194.
58. In the 1990s, various states dropped their prohibitions on investments in equities by
public pension plans, which suggests that they were previously prohibited from making equity
investments. See id. at 188 n.3, 194 (noting that as recently as the mid-1990s, “many public
pension funds had little or no equity investments in their portfolios”).
59. Id. at 194. Recent actions by some public pension plans suggest that they are viewing
alternative investments—private equity, hedge funds, etc.—as a new way to chase yield.
Recently legislatures in Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Kansas, Minnesota, North Carolina,
Tennessee, and Texas passed laws granting or expanding the authority of plans to invest in
alternative investments. H.B. 515, 2011 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ala. 2011); H.B. 1417, 2012 Leg.,
Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2012); S.B. 402, 2011–2012 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2012); H.B. 2461,
2012 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2012); S.B. 1808, 2011–2012 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2012); H.B.
318, 2011 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2011); S.B. 3262, Gen. Assemb., 107th Reg. Sess.
(Tenn. 2012); H.B. 1061, 2011 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2011). Michigan and New Jersey are
considering similar changes. H.B. 5416, 2012 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2012); S.B. 1140, 215th
Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2012).
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principles require that pension plan assets be invested solely in the
interests of trust beneficiaries,60 yet various actors view public pension
funds as “public” money.61 Instead of simply charging pension trustees
with investing trust assets solely in the interest of plan beneficiaries,
many public plans face both affirmative investment requirements as
well as investment restrictions that have little to do with retirees’ best
interests. In many states and cities, plans have affirmative requirements
to invest in the local economy, often referred to as economically
targeted investing (ETI).62 Also common are affirmative requirements
to undertake “social” investing that aims to support not only the
geographic region but also various approved causes.63 Such criteria are
varied, but include requirements to invest in women-, minority-, or
disabled-owned businesses.64 In addition to requirements encouraging
or requiring investments that are thought to have important collateral
benefits, many plans are absolutely restricted from investing in
businesses that are deemed undesirable—such as tobacco companies,
predatory lenders, and those that do business in certain countries.65
Placing both affirmative requirements and restrictions on pension
boards may lead to suboptimal investment decisions,66 although
empirical evidence generally does not show a significant reduction in
rate of return.67 Regardless, it is clear that plans requiring certain
investments and prohibiting others may violate trust law if they require
60. See Langbein & Posner, supra note 7, at 96–97.
61. E.g., Richard W. Stevenson, Pension Funds Becoming a Tool for Growth, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 17, 1992, at D1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1992/03/17/business/pension-fundsbecoming-a-tool-for-growth.html (quoting California’s State Treasurer as stating that “in a
period of great financial transition . . . pension funds have a role to play,” and “where sound
fiduciary decisions can be made and where the pension funds can make a contribution to the
overall economy or the state economy, that’s entirely appropriate”).
62. See, e.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE § 20194(a), (d) (West 2013) (requiring investment in
California real estate unless it would be imprudent to do so); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§§ 3307.152(D)(1), .154(B)(1) (West 2013) (requiring the use of Ohio-based broker-dealers and
investment managers).
63. See Webber, supra note 12, at 2065–68 (discussing socially responsible investing and
its criticisms).
64. Id. at 2067.
65. See, e.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE § 7513.7 (West 2013) (restricting investments in Iran); id.
§ 7513.6 (restricting investments in Sudan); N.Y. RETIRE. & SOC. SEC. LAW § 423-a (West
2013) (restricting investments in Northern Ireland); 40 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5 / 1-110.10 (2013)
(requiring Illinois finance companies to certify compliance with the Illinois High Risk Home
Loan Act in order to be eligible for pension investments).
66. Langbein & Posner, supra note 7, at 76.
67. See, e.g., Hess, supra note 11, at 211, 222 tbl.2 (finding that economically targeted
investing did not impact fund performance); Alicia H. Munnell & Annika Sundén, Investment
Practices of State and Local Pension Funds: Implications for Social Security Reform, in
PENSIONS IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR 153, 154–65 (Olivia S. Mitchell & Edwin C. Hustead eds.,
2001) (finding evidence that plan trustees may in fact undertake such investments only when
they are predicted to match the market rate of return, and further, that economically targeted
investing did not significantly affect fund performance).
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trustees to subordinate the interests of participants and their retirement
security to other unrelated objectives.68
C. The Diffuse Nature of Public Pension
Mismanagement Harms
The nature of public pension plans raises the risk of suboptimal
investing due to political interference, and the diffuse nature of the harm
that results further compounds the problem. Recall that defined benefit
pension plans pay benefit amounts set by formula.69 Any fund returns in
excess of the amount necessary to pay benefits may result in lower
future contribution requirements, but do not otherwise revert to either
participants or beneficiaries.70 As a result, there appears to be little
incentive for plan participants to monitor the investment policies of
their pension plan.71 After all, if close monitoring by participants leads
to the plan earning an additional 1% return on assets, the participant is
no better off. It is in fact future taxpayers who are better off, as they will
need to contribute less money to the plan if the rate of return is higher.72
Theoretically then, it is taxpayers who should monitor fund
performance. Keep in mind, however, that the effects of funding and
investment decisions may not be felt until some point far in the future,
reducing the taxpayer’s incentive to closely monitor such plans. And, of
course, monitoring pension board decisions is a difficult task, with only
small marginal benefits to an individual taxpayer. As will be discussed
below, even if taxpayers were sufficiently motivated to monitor board
performance, they will have a very difficult time challenging
suboptimal decisions.
D. Prior Governance Studies
Most studies of public pension plan governance have focused on the
statistical relationship between board composition and rate of return,
given the concern that political board members will be motivated by
concerns other than minimizing risk and maximizing return.73 As
mentioned above, some of these studies found that the presence of
68. See Langbein & Posner, supra note 7, at 96–97 (concluding that social investing is
contrary to trust law and its statutory counterparts). The Department of Labor has taken the
position in the context of private employer pensions that investments with collateral benefits
(such as meeting certain social objectives) may be undertaken only if the investment, when
judged solely on the basis of its economic value, would be equal to or superior to alternative
available investments. See DOL OP. LTR. 98-04A (May 28, 1998).
69. See supra text accompanying note 20.
70. See Coronado et al., supra note 11, at 581 (“Because most state and local pension
plans are defined benefit plans, it is likely that plan participants have only limited incentives to
monitor the investment policies of the governing board as they are not the residual claimants on
any excess or shortfall of assets relative to the value of their promised benefits.”).
71. Id.
72. See id. (noting that taxpayers are the ones “ultimately liable for sub–par returns”).
73. See supra text accompanying notes 39–42.
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political board members is negatively correlated with rate of return,
while at least one found that political board members are positively
correlated with a fund’s performance.74 One study examined whether
either tight fiscal constraints or political pressure results in plans
manipulating the actuarial assumptions they use in order to lower the
amounts they would otherwise have to contribute to the plan.75 The
study found evidence that plans facing fiscal constraints and those
subject to political pressure are more likely to have optimistic actuarial
assumptions than those plans that are not.76
Other studies have looked at broader governance issues, such as
investment restrictions and the effect of various board duties and
policies on rates of return. Professor Hess found that economically
targeted investment (ETI) and shareholder activism on the part of public
funds had no impact on a fund’s rate of return.77 That same study,
however, found that having an ethics code was negatively correlated
with rate of return.78 Two studies found that the application of the duty
of prudence to pension trustees had an insignificant effect on rate of
return.79 A later study found a positive correlation between both the
duty of prudence and the presence of elected board members, but in
both cases the impact was a relatively small quarter-point improvement
in returns.80 We could not locate any prior studies that examined plans’
complete package of governance provisions, or examined the issue of
enforcement.
II. STATE AND LOCAL PLAN GOVERNANCE PROVISIONS
While comprehensive studies of public plan governance provisions
are lacking, several expert bodies have reacted to the perceived
shortcomings in public plan governance by issuing recommendations
and best practices for public plans. The sections below review the two
primary sets of recommendations, those put forward in a model act by
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and
those issued by the Stanford Institutional Investors’ Forum. This Part
also provides an overview of how the federal government has structured
its pension plan, before Part III presents the results of our current study.
74. See supra text accompanying note 11.
75. Tim V. Eaton & John R. Nofsinger, The Effect of Financial Constraints and Political
Pressure on the Management of Public Pension Plans, 23 J. ACCT. & PUB. POL’Y 161, 163
(2004).
76. Id.
77. Hess, supra note 11, at 211.
78. Id. at 214.
79. Olivia Mitchell & Ping-Lung Hsin, Public Pension Governance and Performance, in
THE ECONOMICS OF PENSIONS: PRINCIPLES, POLICIES, AND INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCE (Salvador
Valdés-Prieto ed., 1997); John R. Nofsinger, Why Targeted Investing Does Not Make Sense!,
FIN. MGMT., Autumn 1998, at 87, 92, 93 tbl.2.
80. Coronado et al., supra note 11, at 588 tbl.5.
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A. The Model Act
In 1997, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws (NCCUSL), approved and recommended the “Uniform
Management of Public Employee Retirement Systems Act” (Model
Act).81 The drafters noted that public plans were not subject to the
participant protections contained in the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), the federal law that governs retirement
plans sponsored by private employers.82 They also noted that state laws
differed significantly in how they regulated such plans, and that state
laws relating to public retirement plans have “failed to keep pace with
modern investment practices.”83 The drafters of the Act sought to
protect participants and beneficiaries by imposing fiduciary duties on
plan trustees and by allowing effective monitoring of such plans
through significant disclosure requirements.84 The Model Act does not
address notable issues such as funding requirements or board
composition and trustee expertise.85
The fiduciary duties contained in the Model Act subject public plan
trustees to duties that are very similar to those imposed on private plan
fiduciaries under ERISA.86 Trustees and other fiduciaries are required
under the Act to discharge their duties:
(1) solely in the interest of the participants and
beneficiaries;
(2) for the exclusive purpose of providing benefits to
participants and beneficiaries and paying reasonable
expenses of administering the system;
(3) with the care, skill, and caution under the circumstances
then prevailing which a prudent person acting in a like
81. UNIF. MGMT. OF PUB. EMP. RET. SYS. ACT (1997), available at
http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/management_public_employee_retirement_systems/
mpersa_final_97.pdf.
82. Id. prefatory note, at 1 (1997).
83. Id.
84. Id. While the focus of the Act is on fiduciary duties and disclosure, the Act covers a
total of six categories: trust requirements; trustee authority over assets; trustee and fiduciary
duties; disclosure requirements; enforcement provisions; and a prohibition on assignment or
alienation of benefits under most circumstances. Id.
85. Informal conversations with individuals involved in the NCCUSL process indicate
that these issues were omitted from the deliberations about the Model Act because they were
considered “too political” and therefore unlikely to ever be adopted.
86. While the Model Act borrows extensively from the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), NCCUSL declined to incorporate ERISA’s prohibited
transaction rules, which make certain transactions with related parties per se impermissible. See
Steven L. Willborn, Public Pensions and the Uniform Management of Public Employee
Retirement Systems Act, 51 RUTGERS L. REV. 141, 148–49 (1998) (stating the opinion of the
committee that the prohibited transaction rules would add unnecessary complexity and duplicate
what many states already had in conflict of interest policies).
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capacity and familiar with those matters would use in the
conduct of an activity of like character and purpose;
(4) impartially, taking into account any differing interests
of participants and beneficiaries;
(5) incurring only costs that are appropriate and reasonable;
and
(6) in accordance with a good-faith interpretation of the law
governing the retirement program and system.87
Note that in evaluating the actions of fiduciaries, the Act adopts a
prudent person standard, where a fiduciary’s actions are evaluated
against those of “a prudent person acting in like capacity and familiar
with those matters,”88 rather than adopting a higher “prudent expert”
standard.89
In addition to detailing the duties that a plan trustee owes to plan
participants and beneficiaries, the Act goes into significant detail with
respect to trustees’ investment decisions. The Act lists six factors that
trustees shall take into account when making investment decisions, and
requires that plan investments be diversified unless it is clearly prudent
not to do so.90 A major divergence from existing state law is the Act’s
prohibition of categoric restrictions on investments.91 At the time
NCCUSL adopted the Model Act, over half the states had some type of
categoric restriction92 on plan investments in place.93 The Model Act
also provides that trustees may consider the collateral benefits of an
investment (i.e., those created in addition to investment return) “only if
the trustee determines that the investment providing these collateral
benefits would be prudent even without the collateral benefits.”94 This
provision regarding collateral benefits is important with respect to
placing limitations on so-called economically targeted or social
investing provisions. As was previously mentioned, there are many
reasons why public pension funds might want to use trust assets to
invest in the local economy. The provision in the Model Act regarding
collateral benefits would permit such investment only if the investment
would be prudent without considering collateral benefits such as a boost
to the state economy or an increase in local employment. This approach
87. UNIF. MGMT. OF PUB. EMP. RET. SYS. ACT § 7, at 22–23 (1997), available at
http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/management_public_employee_retirement_systems/m
persa_final_97.pdf.
88. Id. § 7(3), at 23.
89. Willborn, supra note 86, at 147.
90. UNIF. MGMT. OF PUB. EMP. RET. SYS. ACT § 8(a)(1)–(2), at 27–28.
91. Willborn, supra note 86, at 150.
92. Categoric restrictions are those that prohibit entire investment classes, such as a
prohibition on purchasing equities.
93. Willborn, supra note 86, at 150.
94. UNIF. MGMT. OF PUB. EMP. RET. SYS. ACT § 8(a)(5), at 28.
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to economically targeted or social investing is consistent with
Department of Labor guidelines that apply to private pension plan
investments.95 Finally, the Model Act requires public plans to adopt an
investment policy that details the plan’s investment strategy and
approach.96
The Model Act not only imposes fiduciary duties and investment
regulation but also fairly extensive disclosure obligations on public
retirement systems.97 The aim of such disclosure requirements is to both
signal to trustees and fiduciaries that they will be held accountable and
allow interested parties to perform a monitoring function, whether that
be unions, the press, or participants and beneficiaries.98 Under the
Model Act, public plans are required to distribute a summary plan
description and summaries of any material modification to the plan, as
well as an annual report and annual financial disclosure.99
While not emphasized in the Act’s prefatory note, the Model Act
also contains significant enforcement provisions. The Act provides that
fiduciaries are personally liable for any losses that result from a breach
of fiduciary duty, and that any agreements attempting to limit such
liability are void.100 Fiduciaries are, however, permitted to carry various
types of liability insurance.101 According to one participant in the
NCCUSL process, the provision in the Model Act providing for
personal liability for fiduciaries is “undoubtedly one of the most
controversial provisions of the Act.”102 The Act further provides that a
public employer, participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary may maintain a
cause of action to enjoin an act, practice, or omission that violates the
Act, or for other appropriate equitable relief.103 This enforcement
language is based largely on ERISA’s provisions that apply to private
employer plans.104
Despite the relatively modest aims of the Model Act, in the fifteen
years since NCCUSL approved the Act, only two states, Wyoming and
Maryland, have adopted it.105 Evidence shows that only one other state
95. Id. § 8 cmt. at 32; see also DOL Op. Ltr. 98-04A.
96. UNIF. MGMT. OF PUB. EMP. RET. SYS. ACT §8(b), at 28–29.
97. See id. §§ 13–17, at 44–57 (outlining reporting and disclosure requirements for all
retirement systems).
98. Willborn, supra note 86, at 168–69. One study suggests that public plans have room
for improvement when it comes to complying with required accounting disclosures, reinforcing
the need for clear and enforceable disclosure requirements. See generally Thomas E. Vermeer et
al., Do Local Governments Present Required Disclosures for Defined Benefit Pension Plans?,
31 J. ACCT. & PUB. POL’Y 44 (2012).
99. UNIF. MGMT. OF PUB. EMP. RET. SYS. ACT § 13(a), at 44.
100. Id. § 11(a)–(b), at 39.
101. Id. § 11(c)–(d), at 39–40.
102. Willborn, supra note 86, at 160–61.
103. UNIF. MGMT. OF PUB. EMP. RET. SYS. ACT § 19(a), at 59.
104. Id. § 11 cmt. at 41–43.
105. MD. CODE ANN., STATE PERS. & PENS. § 40-101 (2013); see WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 9-3401 to 9-3-454 (2013) (enacting retirement statutes similar to the Model Act).
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even considered the Model Act,106 which indicates perhaps that states
view the Model Act as flawed in some way or that they simply are not
interested in public plan governance reform. One goal of our study is to
better understand how state and local plan governance diverges from the
Model Act, given its very low adoption rate.
B. The Clapman Report
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
was not the only expert body to weigh in on public plan governance. In
2007, the Stanford Institutional Investors’ Forum issued a committee
report recommending best practices for pension funds, commonly
referred to as the “Clapman Report” in reference to the committee’s
chair, Peter Clapman.107 The best practices focus on five key areas:
transparency of a fund’s rules and governance structure; a fund’s
leadership, including the governing body and executive staff; trustee
attributes and core competencies; approach to addressing conflicts of
interest and related disclosure policy; and delegation of duties and
allocation of responsibilities among relevant authorities.108 The
Clapman Report does not address either funding requirements or
enforcement provisions.
The principles begin with an emphasis on the need for transparency
regarding the rules and principles controlling a fund’s governance and
management of actual and potential conflicts of interest, emphasizing
that such rules should be available in a single location where interested
parties can easily access them.109 All relevant statutes, regulations, and
other sources of law such as judicial opinions should also be included
within this central location.110 With respect to the governing body, the
committee recommends that it “should consist of appropriately
qualified, experienced individuals dedicated to fulfilling their fiduciary
duties to fund beneficiaries. Viewed as a group, the board should be
composed of individuals with a portfolio of skills that allows it to make
responsible, informed investment and legal decisions, and to discharge
its fiduciary obligations to fund beneficiaries.”111 The committee also
recommends that the governing body abide by ERISA-like fiduciary
duties.112 While acknowledging a place for varied experiences and roles,
the committee lists attributes and core competencies that each individual
trustee should possess.113 Most of these attributes focus on the ability of
the individual to make independent, well-reasoned decisions consistent
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

H.B. 6348, 1999 Leg., Jan. Sess. (Conn. 1999).
CLAPMAN REPORT, supra note 15.
Id. at 5.
Id. at 6.
Id.
Id. at 7.
Id. at 8. ERISA’s primary fiduciary provisions can be found at 29 U.S.C. § 1104.
Id. at 10–11.
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with fiduciary obligations.114 The report also recommends that a
governing body should have a “sufficient number of trustees competent
in financial and accounting matters so that the body is capable of
understanding modern portfolio theory, diversification principles, basic
financial analysis, and fundamental accounting principles.”115
The Clapman Report also spends a fair amount of time discussing
issues related to potential conflicts of interest. It begins with the
recommendation that the fund should establish and disclose its conflict
of interest policy and provide training for affected parties.116 The
committee not only defines “conflicts of interest” for this purpose but
also recommends that governing bodies require the recusal of trustees
who have even the appearance of a conflict of interest with respect to a
transaction.117 The committee notes that for a fund to enforce a conflict
of interest policy, appropriate authorities must have access to the
information that suggests a conflict of interest exists. The committee
then details what kind of information is relevant and that trustees must
report. In addition, the committee details twelve items that the fund
should publicly disclose,118 including an annual summary of actual or
potential conflicts of interest that were identified and how they were
managed or controlled.119
The report supports delegation of board duties where the delegation
is made consistent with the trustees’ fiduciary obligations.120 In
addition, the report recommends that any outside parties to whom
material responsibility is delegated comply with the fund’s conflict of
interest and ethics policies; in particular, disclosing all relationships
with providers or suppliers that they recommend to the fund.121 Our
research did not find any plan formally adopting the recommendations
of the Clapman Report, although given the nature of these
recommendations, such actions may be difficult to reliably find.
C. Federal Employees’ Retirement System
State and local governments are not alone in struggling with the
difficult issues involved in investing a large amount of assets for the
benefit of public employees. The federal government also maintains a
defined benefit pension plan for its workers, and its governance
provisions provide an interesting contrast and alternative approach to
that taken by state and local plans. The Federal Employees’ Retirement
System (FERS), which is the pension plan for federal workers hired on
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

Id.
Id. at 11.
See id. at 13–16.
Id. at 13.
Id. at 14–15.
Id. at 14.
Id. at 17.
Id.
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or after January 1, 1984, has a relatively simple governance system.
While employee contribution rates are set by statute, participating
federal agencies are required to contribute annually the full normal cost
of benefits less employee contributions.122 The employee and employer
contributions are credited to the Civil Service Retirement and Disability
Fund, where 100% of the amounts contributed are used to purchase
special-issue U.S. Treasury Bonds.123 In explaining why the federal
employee plan invests only in Treasury bonds, the Congressional
Research Service stated:
Who would make the investment decisions, and what
would be the acceptable level of investment risk for the
funds? The most fundamental risk is that poor investment
choices would result in the trust fund losing value over
time. Another question would be how the fund would
decide what assets to purchase. Deciding what would
constitute an appropriate investment for a fund that consists
mainly of monies provided by taxpayers could be
controversial. Not all companies, industries, or countries
would be seen by the public as appropriate places to invest
these funds.124
Because federal agencies must fund the full normal cost of benefits
under FERS, and monies contributed are placed in nonvolatile Treasury
bonds, arguably no further governance provisions are necessary. While
the “funded” status of FERS has varied somewhat over the years, the
most recent estimates suggest that FERS had a surplus of $12.2 billion
at the end of fiscal year 2010.125
D. A Comparison of State and Local Plan
Governance Provisions
The purpose of our study was to examine the governance provisions
that apply to a broad range of state and local pension plans. We
therefore selected six state and six local plans for the study. Within both
the state and local groups, half of the plans are generally considered to
be well funded, while half are considered to be underfunded. We made
these selections on the theory that, if governance provisions do drive
plan performance, a mix of well funded and poorly funded plans would
provide the best range of governance provisions to study. Identifying
plans’ funding status is more difficult than it perhaps seems, given that
self-reported funded ratios are subject to assumptions that may differ
122. 5 U.S.C. §§ 8422–23 (2012).
123. Id.
124. ISAACS, supra note 9, at 14.
125. Stephen Losey, FERS Retirement Fund Projects Surplus, FED. TIMES (Apr. 23, 2012,
6:00 AM), http://www.federaltimes.com/article/20120423/BENEFITS02/204230302/1041/
BENEFITS.
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dramatically among plans.126 As a result, we used third-party reports
that attempted to standardize funding assumptions to accurately identify
relatively well-funded and less-well-funded plans.127 The six state plans
selected include three funds—California Public Employees’ Retirement
System (CALPERS), Florida Retirement System (Florida RS), and
Washington Public Employees’ Retirement System (Washington
PERS)—that are relatively well funded and three funds—the Teachers’
Retirement System of the State of Illinois (Illinois TRS), New York
State & Local Employees’ Retirement System (New York State &
Local ERS), and the State Teachers Retirement System of Ohio (Ohio
STRS)—that are relatively underfunded. At the municipal level we
selected three well-funded municipal plans: the City of Milwaukee
Employees’ Retirement System, the City of Tampa General Employee
Retirement Fund, and the San Antonio Police & Fire Pension Fund.
Also included were three plans that are generally considered
underfunded: the City of Philadelphia Pension System, the State-Boston
Retirement System, and the Teachers’ Retirement System of New York
City.
Our definition of “governance” provisions was quite broad. We
included relevant statutes, regulations, and also internal governance
documents such as investment policies and procedures. While not
strictly a governance provision, we also included any funding
requirements relevant to the plan. After all, even a plan with ideal
governance provisions may fail if the government has no obligation to
contribute an amount to adequately fund liabilities.
A plan’s governance provisions may, of course, be useful only to the
extent that they can be enforced. For that reason, we also researched
whether the plan had been a party to two different types of lawsuits. The
first were lawsuits that sought to enforce the government’s funding
obligation (if any) and the second were lawsuits that sought to enforce
pure governance provisions—namely, how the plan trustees managed
the plan’s assets.128 And because some allegations of mismanagement
126. Forman, supra note 23, at 848.
127. For state-level plans, we relied on research from the Center for Retirement Research at
Boston College, Alicia H. Munnell et al., supra note 51. To select local plans, we used Robert
Novy-Marx & Joshua Rauh, The Crisis in Local Government Pensions in the United States, in
GROWING OLD: PAYING FOR RETIREMENT AND INSTITUTIONAL MONEY MANAGEMENT AFTER THE
FINANCIAL CRISIS 47 (Yasuyuki Fuchita, Richard J. Herring & Robert E. Litan eds., 2011)
(examining the adequacy of funding for state-level plans). We did not simply pick the top three
and bottom three plans identified by the publications, but also took into account some
geographic diversity. For example, because we included Illinois TRS as an underfunded plan in
our state study, we did not include any City of Chicago plans as underfunded plans in our
municipal study group. There is, however, some geographic duplication between our state and
local plans.
128. There is a third type of lawsuit, those that challenge the payment of an individual’s
benefit under the plan. Because those lawsuits are challenging the interpretation of the plan’s
benefit provisions, and not its funding or governance, they were not relevant to our study.
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may also be handled through settlements outside the court system, we
searched news sources to determine whether any such allegations had
been made and how they were addressed.
After gathering all of the relevant data, we compared the results
against the main provisions of the Model Act, as well as the main
criteria in the Clapman Report. The results are presented in detail
below, with key points summarized at a high level in Appendices A and
B.
1. General Trust & Fiduciary Provisions
i. State Plans
Most of the trust and fiduciary provisions in the Model Act can be
found in our sample of state plans. All state plans hold plan assets in
trust129 and are subject to fiduciary powers and duties that are
substantially consistent with the Model Act. For all plans, trustees are
required to act solely in the interest of beneficiaries, and in most cases
this duty is further clarified as acting with the exclusive purpose of
providing benefits and paying reasonable expenses.130 All state plans
contain the key fiduciary standard of the Model Act, which is that
trustees are to act with the care, skill, and caution of a prudent person in
light of the circumstances at the time of the decision.131 Four plans in
our state sample protect participants’ benefits from creditors by
statutorily prohibiting assignment or alienation of member benefits.132
There are a number of provisions in the Model Act that either none
or few of the state plans mirror. None of the fund governance provisions
from our sample require that trustees act in accordance with a good faith
interpretation of the law, and only one-third of state plans require them

129. CAL. CONST. art. XVI, § 17(a); FLA. STAT. § 121.045 (2013); N.Y. RETIRE. & SOC.
SEC. LAW § 422 (McKinney 2013); New York Office of the State Comptroller, Opinion 90-54
(1990), available at http://osc.state.ny.us/legal/1990/legalop/op90-54.htm; OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 3307.15 (West 2013). In Washington, while plan assets are required to be held in trust
for investment purposes, the funds themselves are not trusts. WASH. REV. CODE § 41.34.120
(2013); Retired Pub. Emps.’ Council of Wash. v. Charles, 62 P.3d 470, 481 (Wash. 2003). Our
finding with respect to trust requirements is not surprising, given that plans must hold assets in
trusts to comply with Internal Revenue Code requirements. See I.R.C. § 401(a) (2006) (listing
the requirements for pension plan trusts).
130. CAL. CONST. art. XVI, § 17(a); FLA. STAT. §§ 121.30, 215.444; 40 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5
/ 1-109 (2013); N.Y. RETIRE. & SOC. SEC. LAW § 177; N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 11,
§ 136-2.1 (2013); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3307.15; WASH. REV. CODE § 41.34.120.
131. CAL. CONST. art. XVI § 17(c); CAL. GOV’T CODE § 20151(c) (West 2013); FLA. STAT.
§ 215.47(10); 40 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5 / 1-109(b); N.Y. RETIRE. & SOC. SEC. LAW § 17(9)(b); N.Y.
COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 11, §136-2.3(a); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3307.15(A); WASH. REV.
CODE § 43.33A.140.
132. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 21255; FLA. STAT. § 121.131; N.Y. RET. & SOC. SEC. LAW
§ 110(3); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3307.41.
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to only pay costs that are appropriate and reasonable.133 No state plans
explicitly require trustees to act impartially.
ii. Local Plans
All of the municipal funds studied hold their assets in trust,134 and
most provide that the trustees must act solely in the interests of
participants and beneficiaries.135 Notably, however, the governance
provisions of two of the three underfunded local plans do not even
explicitly state this core fiduciary duty. Three municipal funds mirror
the key Model Act standard that trustees are required to act with the
care, skill, and caution that a prudent person would use under the
circumstances,136 and two well-funded plans require trustees to follow
the stricter “prudent investor” standard.137 Five of the local plans in our
study protect participants’ benefits through anti-alienation and antiassignment provisions, consistent with the Model Act.138
There are many Model Act fiduciary provisions that no municipal
plan in our study has in its governance provisions. These include the
requirements that trustees act impartially and incur costs only that are
reasonable and appropriate. Only one municipal plan has a requirement
similar to the Model Act’s provision that trustees act in accordance with
a good-faith interpretation of the law governing the retirement
system.139 On the whole, the municipal plans studied have much less
detailed fiduciary provisions than the Model Act requires, and two of
the underfunded plans fail to contain even basic provisions regarding
fiduciary duty.

133. CAL. CONST. art. XVI, § 17(b); CAL GOV’T CODE § 20151(a)(2); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 3307.15(a).
134. BOS., MASS., MUN. CODE 5-6.3 (2011); 1945 Fla. Laws, ch. 23559, § 6(A) (amended
2011); MILWAUKEE, WIS., CITY CHARTER § 36-09 (2013); N.Y.C., N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 13-534
(2013); PHILA., PA., CODE § 22-1001 (2013); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6243o, § 1.04(a)
(West 2013).
135. FLA. STAT. § 112.656(1); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 32, § 23(3) (West 2013);
MILWAUKEE, WIS., CITY CHARTER § 36-09-1-d-3; TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6243o,
§ 1.04(b).
136. FLA. STAT. § 112.661(4); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 32, § 23(3); PHILA., PA., CODE
§ 22-1001(1).
137. MILWAUKEE, WIS., CITY CHARTER § 36-09-1-d-1; TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art.
6243o, § 7.04(a).
138. 1945 Fla. Laws, ch. 23559, § 20; MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 32, § 19; MILWAUKEE,
WIS., CITY CHARTER § 36-10-1; PHILA., PA., CODE § 22-1303; TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art.
6243o, § 1.05(a).
139. N.Y.C., N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 13-508.
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2. Investment Provisions
i. State Plans
One of the Model Act’s primary objectives is to enable public plans
to implement modern portfolio theory in structuring their investment
decisions.140 To that end, the Model Act provides that trustees may
invest in any kind of property or type of investment, provided that they
comply with the Act’s other provisions.141 Here a significant, if
unsurprising, divergence becomes evident between the Model Act and
the state plan governance provisions studied.
Nearly every state plan in our study limits the makeup of the
portfolio or the amount of any one company’s stock or bonds that the
plan may hold, and often prohibits specific investments.142 None of the
state plans in our study have governance provisions addressing the
consideration of an investment’s collateral benefits. Most of the state
plans do, however, have provisions favoring home-state investing over
other, comparable investments, and home-state investment managers
over out-of-state investment managers.143
There are several investment provisions of the Model Act that were
not well represented in our state sample. None of the state plans require
trustees to consider general economic conditions when investing,
although all of the plans consider the conditions in their actuarial
reports. Similarly, no state plans specifically require trustees to consider
liquidity, regularity of income, or the preservation or appreciation of
capital when investing.144 No state plans require trustees to annually
review investment objectives or to make a reasonable effort to verify the
140. See UNIF. MGMT. OF PUB. EMP. RET. SYS. ACT prefatory note, at 1–2 (1997), available
at http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/management_public_employee_retirement_ systems/
mpersa_final_97.pdf (“A primary purpose of this Act is to facilitate the incorporation of modern
investment practices into state law regulating the management of public employee retirement
systems.”).
141. Id. § 8(a)(4).
142. See CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 7513.7, 7513.6 (West 2013) (restricting investments in Iran
and Sudan, respectively); 40 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5 / 1-110.6, 1-110.15 (2013) (restricting
investments in Sudan and Iran, respectively); N.Y. RETIRE. & SOC. SEC. LAW §§ 13, 177, 423-a
(McKinney 2013) (restricting investments in Northern Ireland); WASH. REV. CODE
§ 43.33A.140(2) (2013). Florida approves specific investments. FLA. STAT. § 215.47 (2013).
143. See, e.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE § 20194(a), (d) (requiring investment in California real
estate unless imprudent to do so); FLA. STAT. § 215.47(7) (favoring investment in Florida-based
technology and growth businesses); 40 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5 / 1A-108.5 (encouraging funds to
invest in Illinois businesses); N.Y. RETIRE. & SOC. SEC. LAW § 423-b (establishing a venture
capital fund for New York businesses); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3307.152(D)(1), .154(B)(1)
(increasing use of Ohio-qualified licensed securities dealers and investment managers,
respectively).
144. Ohio STRS does, however, have a board policy that contains a specific liquidity
requirement when investing. STATE TEACHERS RET. SYS. OF OHIO, COMPREHENSIVE ANNUAL
FINANCIAL REPORT 39 (2011), available
at https://www.strsoh.org/_pdfs/annualreports/
cafrs/2011_cafr.pdf.

1342

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66

facts of investments. Only one plan has any governance provisions
related to the consideration of inflation,145 and only one requires that
trustees consider investments in the context of the overall portfolio.146
There are a number of investment provisions from the Model Act
that are almost universally adopted in our sample of state plans. Every
state plan requires trustees to develop a statement of investment
objectives or policies147 and to consider the investment’s total return
when investing.148 Nearly all plans require trustees to diversify
investments unless it would be clearly prudent not to do so.149
ii. Local Plans
Like the state plans discussed above, the municipal plans in our
study do not reflect the ideals of the Model Act, which favor
unrestricted investing and a complex mix of factors that should inform
investment decision-making.150 Of the six municipal plans in our study,
only one well-funded plan allows unrestricted investment.151 The other
local plans all have some type of investment restriction in place,
generally placing limits on certain types of investments and completely
prohibiting others.152 Notably, only one of the local plans studied
145. The Model Act requires trustees to consider the impact of inflation and deflation when
making investment decisions. UNIF. MGMT. OF PUB. EMP. RET. SYS. ACT § 8(a)(1)(B)
(1997), available at
http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/management_public_employee_
retirement_systems/mpersa_final_97.pdf. None of our state plans contained that explicit
requirement. Washington PERS, however, requires a statutorily defined rate of inflation to be
considered for asset valuation. WASH. REV. CODE § 41.45.035(1)(a) (2013).
146. WASH. REV. CODE § 43.33A.140(1).
147. FLA. STAT. § 215.475(1); FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 19-3.0161 (2013); 40 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 5 / 1-113.6; N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 11, § 136-2.3(b) (2013); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 3307.15(B); WASH. REV. CODE § 43.84.150.
148. This is required by statute or board policy in each plan. CAL. CONST. art. XVI, § 17(d);
FLA. STAT. § 215.47(10); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3307.15(B) (West 2013); WASH. REV. CODE
§ 43.33A.110; ILLINOIS STATE BOARD OF INVESTMENT, INVESTMENT POLICY 4 (2013),
available at http://www2.illinois.gov/isbi/Documents/Investment-Policy.pdf; OFFICE OF THE
STATE COMPTROLLER, GENERAL INVESTMENT POLICIES FOR THE NEW YORK STATE COMMON
RETIREMENT FUND
6
(2010),
available
at
http://www.osc.state.ny.us/pension/
generalpolicies.pdf.
149. CAL. CONST. art. XVI, § 17(d); FLA. STAT. § 112.661(8); 40 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5 / 1109(c); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3307.15(A); WASH. REV. CODE § 43.33A.140(2).
150. UNIF. MGMT. OF PUB. EMP. RET. SYS. ACT prefatory note, at 1–3 (1997), available at
http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/management_public_employee_retirement_systems/m
persa_final_97.pdf.
151. The San Antonio plan was the only plan in our study without investment restrictions.
The San Antonio plan’s investment provisions can be found at TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art.
6243o, § 7.04 (West 2013).
152. For example, in the Tampa plan, no more than 65% of assets can be invested in
common or preferred stock, with no more than 10% invested in the common stock of a single
company. In addition, only bonds with certain ratings can be purchased. CITY OF TAMPA,
RETIREMENT PLAN FOR CITY OF TAMPA GENERAL EMPLOYEES § 6(C)(2), at 7 (2011), available
at http://www.tampagov.net/dept_general_employee_retirement_fund/files/2011_ Retirement_
Plan.pdf.

2014]

WHO’S AFRAID OF GOOD GOVERNANCE?

1343

contains social investing provisions. The Philadelphia plan prohibits
investment in companies operating in Northern Ireland that do not
follow the MacBride Principles,153 as well as investments in tobacco
companies and those companies engaged in predatory lending.154
Interestingly, only one of the local plans in our study has an affirmative
requirement that favors the local economy. The Tampa plan is subject to
a requirement, imposed by state law, to use in-state investment
managers.155
The City of Philadelphia, one of the underfunded local plans in our
study, spells out standards that investment managers must meet to be
chosen to handle plan assets.156 However, the Investment Policy
adopted by the Plan’s investment committee then provides that such
standards may be lowered if necessary to “increase participation of
minority-, women-, and disabled-owned investment managers.”157
Philadelphia is the only local plan in our study that prohibits the hiring
of investment managers that made a contribution to a municipal official
or candidate in the municipality that controls the pension system,
although this restriction is provided through state, and not local, law.158
The Model Act contains very detailed provisions regarding trustee
investment decisions.159 As with the fiduciary duty requirements
discussed above, the municipal plans studied contain much less detail
with respect to investment decision-making than the Model Act. There
are several Model Act provisions related to investment decisions that
we did not find in any municipal plan’s governance provisions. The
provisions that are wholly absent from the municipal plans are the
requirements that trustees charged with investing and managing the
assets shall consider general economic conditions, the possible effect of
inflation or deflation, expected total return, needs for liquidity,
regularity of income, and preservation or appreciation of capital; and
that the trustees can only consider collateral benefits of an investment if
the investment would be prudent without the collateral benefit.160
153. The “MacBride Principles” are a corporate code of conduct for U.S. firms doing
business in Northern Ireland, and are designed to counter religious discrimination in the
workplace. Sean McManus, The MacBride Principles–The Essence, IRISH NAT’L CAUCUS,
http://www.irishnationalcaucus.org/the-macbride-principles-the-essence/ (last updated Feb.
2001).
154. PHILA., PA., CODE §§ 22-1001(3), (4), (5) (2013).
155. CITY OF TAMPA, RETIREMENT PLAN FOR CITY OF TAMPA GENERAL EMPLOYEES § 6(A).
156. CITY OF PHILA. BD. OF PENSIONS & RET., INVESTMENT DIVISION, POLICIES AND
PROCEDURES MANUAL § 10.1, at 70–71 (2012), available at http://www.phila.gov/pensions/
pdfs/Investment_Policy_2012-.pdf.
157. Id. § 10.2, at 72.
158. 53 PA. CONS. STAT. § 895.704-A(a) (2013).
159. See UNIF. MGMT. OF PUB. EMP. RET. SYS. ACT §§ 7–11 (1997), available at
http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/management_public_employee_retirement_systems/m
persa_final_97.pdf (outlining duties, review, and liabilities of trustees).
160. See id. § 8(a)(1), (5) (outlining a trustee’s duty to prudently invest and manage assets
while considering several factors).
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Another group of investment-related provisions from the Model Act
is present only in a small number of local plans in the study group. Two
of the well-funded municipal plans provide that trustees charged with
investing and managing the assets should consider the role that each
investment plays within the overall portfolio.161 Half of the local plans
(two well funded and one underfunded) provide that trustees should
diversify plan investments unless it is clearly prudent not to do so.162
Only a single well-funded municipal plan provides that trustees should
make a reasonable effort to verify facts relevant to the investment and
management of the assets.163
The Model Act also provides that trustees must adopt a statement of
investment objectives and policies.164 The governance provisions of two
local plans in our study have such a requirement (one well-funded and
one underfunded plan), although for one of these plans the investment
policy is both very brief and difficult to locate.165 One underfunded
local plan has an investment policy in place, although it is not required
to do so.166 That same plan did, however, adopt an internal rule that
investment objectives and policies be reviewed annually—the only
municipal plan in our study to do so.167 Half of the municipal plans in
our study not only have no affirmative requirement to adopt an
investment policy, but they also do not voluntarily create such a policy
and make it publicly available. In other words, for half of the municipal
plans, there would be no easy way for an interested party to determine
the basis on which the plan is making investments.

161. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6243o, § 7.04(b) (West 2013); MILWAUKEE, WIS.,
CITY CHARTER § 36-09-1-d-1 (2011).
162. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 32, § 23(3) (2013); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6243o,
§ 7.04(b); MILWAUKEE, WIS., CITY CHARTER § 36-09-1-d-2.
163. MILWAUKEE, WIS., CITY CHARTER § 36-09-1-d-1.
164. UNIF. MGMT. OF PUB. EMP. RET. SYS. ACT § 8(b).
165. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 32, § 20(5)(i) (requiring disclosure of the plan’s investment
policy in its annual report); MILWAUKEE, WIS., CITY CHARTER § 36-09-1-b (requiring written
objectives and guidelines for investment). Boston’s investment policy is available only in
its annual report. It is less than one-half of a page in length. STATE-BOSTON RET. SYS.,
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS AND REQUIRED SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION 11 (2010), available
at http://www.cityofboston.gov/Images_Documents/12388State-Boston-FS-1210-FINAL_tcm329473.pdf.
166. The City of Philadelphia does not appear to be subject to any requirement to create an
investment policy, yet it has done so. See CITY OF PHILA. BD. OF PENSIONS & RET., INVESTMENT
DIVISION, POLICIES AND PROCEDURES MANUAL § 5.1 (2012), available at http://www.phila.gov/
pensions/pdfs/Investment_Policy_2012-.pdf (suggesting that the nonrequired Investment Policy
Statement should be reviewed).
167. Id.
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3. Board Composition and Trustee Expertise
i. State Plans
While the Model Act is silent with respect to board composition and
trustee expertise, much has been written about public pension plan
board composition.168 The Clapman Report does not prescribe a specific
board makeup, but instead focuses on ensuring that board trustees have
relevant expertise and continually monitor and update their skills.169
Although the specific details of board composition among our state
plans vary, five of the six plans were governed by boards comprised of
a majority of political officials or political appointees.170 Only one,
relatively underfunded plan, Ohio STRS, had a board that had a
majority of elected members.171
The Clapman Report also recommends that for boards to function
effectively, they need the authority to select or dismiss key staff
members.172 In all state plans, the board or Comptroller is able to hire or
dismiss key staff, although in Florida that power is limited by a
requirement that the governor must also vote in favor of any executive
director approved by the board.173
Nearly all trustees in our state study group are required to have
investment experience and expertise or be advised by an individual or
168. See, e.g., Coronado et al., supra note 11 (examining whether political influence over
pension funds lead to subpar returns on their portfolios); Romano, supra note 11 (examining the
relationship between fund performance, organizational form, and corporate activism).
169. See CLAPMAN REPORT, supra note 15, at 10–12 (outlining a trustee’s attributes, core
competencies, and duties to the fund).
170. Among the better-funded plans, Florida RS has a three member board, all of whom are
government officials: the Governor as chair, the state Chief Financial Officer, and the Attorney
General. FLA. STAT. § 215.44(1) (2013). Washington PERS has a fifteen-member board, and the
ten voting members are evenly split between plan participants and government officials, but the
majority of the plan participants are appointed by the governor. WASH. REV. CODE § 43.33A.020
(2013). California PERS has a twelve-member board, six of whom are elected plan participants,
and six of whom are government officials or appointed by government officials. CAL. GOV’T
CODE § 20090 (West 2013). Among the less well-funded plans, Illinois TRS has a thirteen
member board consisting of one ex officio government official, six members appointed by the
governor with the consent of the senate, and six members elected from plan participants. 40 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 5 / 16-163 to 16-165 (2013). Finally, New York State & Local ERS has no
board—the State Comptroller is the trustee and individual in charge of the retirement fund. N.Y.
COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 11, § 136-2.3 (2013).
171. Ohio STRS has a board of eleven members, seven of whom are elected plan
participants and three of whom are appointed by government officials. The eleventh member is
the superintendent of public instruction or a designee. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3307.05 (West
2013).
172. CLAPMAN REPORT, supra note 15, at 8.
173. FLA. STAT. § 215.441; 40 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5 / 16-163; OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§3307.04; WASH. REV. CODE § 43.33A.100 (2013); OFFICE OF THE STATE COMPTROLLER,
GENERAL INVESTMENT POLICIES FOR THE NEW YORK STATE COMMON RETIREMENT FUND 2–4
(2010), available at http://www.osc.state.ny.us/pension/generalpolicies.pdf; State of Cal. Bd. of
Admin. Pub. Emp. Ret. Sys. Del. Res. No. EXEC-95-101 (III)(C)(1)(c), (IV)(B).
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group that does, with CALPERS being the only plan without any such
requirement.174 Only half of our state plans require trustees to obtain
continuing education.175 None of the plans require an annual evaluation
of trustee skills.
ii. Local Plans
The six local plans in our study have a mix of board composition.
Only one, well-funded plan has a board whose majority was elected by
employee and retiree representatives.176 Three local plans in the study,
one well funded and two poorly funded, have boards with political
appointee majorities.177 One well-funded plan is evenly split between
employee representatives and politicians, while one poorly funded plan
is split evenly between political and elected representatives, with those
board members choosing one additional, independent board member.178
While the boards of well-funded plans are more likely to have
nonpolitical majorities, there certainly is not an overwhelming
correlation between plan structure and plan funded status. Four of the
six local plans in our study have the authority recommended by the
Clapman Report to select or dismiss key staff members, evenly split
between well- and poorly funded plans.179
One underfunded local plan’s board has unique requirements that
govern the board’s ability to act, which appeared to be devised to ensure
174. FLA. STAT. § 215.441; 40 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5 / 16-164; N.Y. RETIRE. & SOC. SEC. LAW
§ 423 (McKinney 2013); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3307.05; WASH. REV. CODE § 43.33A.020.
175. FLA. STAT. § 112.661(14); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3307.051; WASH. STATE INV. BD.,
POLICIES & PROCEDURES 2.00.200 (2012), available at http://www.sib.wa.gov/information/
bi_po.asp.
176. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6243o, § 2.01 (West 2013) (stating that the board
is comprised of nine trustees: the mayor or her appointees, two members of the municipality’s
governing body, two active firefighters elected by plan participants, two active police officers
elected by plan participants, and two elected retirees).
177. See N.Y.C., N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 13-507 (2013) (stating that the board is comprised
of seven members: the president of the Board of Education, the Comptroller of New York City,
two members appointed by the mayor, and three members of the retirement association); PHILA.,
PA., HOME RULE CHARTER, art. 3, § 3.3-803 available at http://www.pacode.com/
secure/data/351/article3/chapter8/chap8toc.html (stating that the board consists of nine trustees,
five of whom are City of Philadelphia officials, and four of whom are elected by the
employees); CITY OF TAMPA, RETIREMENT P LAN FOR CITY OF TAMPA GENERAL EMPLOYEES § 6,
at 7 (2011), available at http://www.tampagov.net/dept_general_employee_retirement_fund/
files/2011_Retirement_Plan.pdf (stating that the board is comprised of seven members: three
elected representatives, three individuals appointed by the major, and the city’s Chief Financial
Officer).
178. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 32, § 20(4)(b) (2013) (stating that the board has five
members: the city auditor, one member appointed by the mayor, two elected representatives, and
one member chosen by the other four board members, who is neither an employee, retiree, or
government official).
179. Id. § 20(4)(e); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6243o, §§ 2.05, 3.01(a), 7.05(a);
MILWAUKEE, WIS., CITY CHARTER 36-15-7 (2013); N.Y.C., N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 13-509
(2013).
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that board decisions are not unduly dominated by either political or
employee members. In the New York City Teacher’s Plan, the board
can act only with the approval of (1) either the comptroller or a board
member elected by the mayor, (2) an elected member, and (3) two other
board members.180
One area where the local plans in our study fall far short of ideals is
with respect to trustee expertise and training. Not a single plan in our
study requires that any trustee have investment and financial market
expertise or experience, or that any type of trustee skill evaluation take
place. Two plans, however, impose some type of trustee training and
continuing education requirements.181 In both of these cases, state (not
local) law provided the trustee educational requirements.182
4. Disclosure Requirements
i. State Plans
The drafters of the Model Act placed a premium on disclosure
requirements, on the theory that disclosure is an essential element to
monitoring and enforcement. All of the state plans in our study fall short
of the Model Act ideal with respect to disclosure.
While all of the state plans are required to issue annual financial and
actuary disclosures,183 as well as an annual report,184 none of the plans
are required to provide summary plan descriptions or summaries of
material modification to plan participants.
State plans follow the Model Act protection of investment decisions
by shielding them entirely from open meeting and records laws, or at
least delaying their disclosure.185 Every state plan board, or the State
180. N.Y.C., N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 13-512.
181. FLA. STAT. § 112.661(14) (2013); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 32, §20(7).
182. See FLA. STAT. § 112.661(14); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 32, §20(7).
183. See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 20227 (2013) (requiring an annual actuarial report); FLA.
STAT. § 112.63(2) (requiring an actuarial report every three years); 40 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5 / 16175 (2013) (requiring an annual financial report for each fiscal year ending in June); N.Y.
RETIRE. & SOC. SEC. LAW § 11(d) (McKinney 2013) (requiring an annual report); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 3307.51(A) (West 2013) (requiring an annual actuarial report); OHIO ADMIN. CODE
3307-1-04 (2013) (requiring an annual actuarial report); WASH. REV. CODE § 41.45.030(1)
(2013) (requiring an actuarial report every two years).
184. See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 7503 (requiring an annual report for all retirement systems);
FLA. STAT. § 121.135 (requiring a report on the operation and condition of state-administered
retirement systems every regular session of the legislature); 40 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5 / 16-175
(requiring an annual financial report); N.Y. RETIRE. & SOC. SEC. LAW § 11(d) (requiring an
annual report); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 171.04(B); WASH. REV. CODE § 41.50.265 (requiring an
annual report of all “funds in the treasurer’s custody belonging to the public employees’
retirement system”).
185. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 2, § 559(d)(9) (2013) (delaying disclosure until the first open
meeting of the Investment Committee); FLA. STAT. § 215.4401(2) (delaying disclosure until
thirty days after completion of an investment transaction); 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 120 / 2(c)(7)
(allowing closed meeting to consider the “sale or purchase of securities, investments, or
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Comptroller in the case of the New York State & Local ERS, is
statutorily subject to a code of conduct or ethics that covers conflicts of
interest, and all but one well-funded plan (Washington PERS) must
disclose actual or potential conflicts of interest.186 In all cases, the board
or State Comptroller defines governance rules and makes them
accessible to the public.187 While not required by statute, all funds also
publicly disclose organizational charts.188
ii. Local Plans
Like the state plans in our study, all of the municipal plans fall short
of the Model Act ideal with respect to disclosure. Each of the municipal
plans in our study is required to provide some type of annual report that
includes financial information,189 while only one plan requires that a
plan summary be provided to participants,190 and none require that
participants be updated if there is a material modification of the plan.
While most of the Model Act’s disclosure provisions are aimed at
enabling effective monitoring, one of the provisions provides that the
plan need not disclose information under state open meeting and records
laws if doing so would jeopardize investment decisions and objectives.
None of the municipal plans in our study provide such protection.
investment contracts”); N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW §105(1)(h) (McKinney 2013) (allowing a closed
executive meeting, with a majority vote in an open meeting, for the purpose of investment);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 121.22(G) (allowing executive sessions with a majority vote); WASH.
REV. CODE § 42.56.270(6) (exempting from disclosure any “financial and commercial
information supplied to the state investment board when the information relates to the
investment of public trust or retirement funds” if disclosure does not result in a loss).
186. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 2, §§ 560, 18730 (2013) (requiring the adoption of a conflict of
interest code and explaining disclosure requirements and prohibitions); FLA. STAT. §§ 112.3144,
.3145(2)(e), .3146 (defining the code of ethics and disclosure for officers, defining board
members, and requiring board member disclosures to be public); 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 420 / 3A30, 3A-35, 4A-102 (explaining required disclosure of contracts with the state, conflicts of
interest, and general disclosure requirements); N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 74 (defining code of ethics
for public employees); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 2, §§ 136-2.4, 136-2.5(g)(5), 320.5
(2013) (defining governance responsibility and ethics provisions for employees, committees,
investment managers, and consultants; requiring triennial audits of conflict of interest
disclosures; defining code of ethics for advisory council); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 102.01,
102.02(A) (defining terms and requiring disclosures); WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 287-04-029 (2013)
(defining the code of conduct for board members and employees of the board); see also WASH.
STATE INV. BD., POLICY 2.00.100 (2011), available at http://www.sib.wa.gov/information/
bi_po.asp (detailing the conflict of interest policy, requiring disclosure, and providing for
monitoring).
187. This information is available through the plans’ websites.
188. This information is provided through the plans’ websites.
189. FLA. STAT. §. 112.661(15); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 32, § 20(5)(i) (2013); MILWAUKEE,
WIS., CITY CHARTER § 36-15-9 (2013); N.Y.C., N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 13-517 (2013); 53 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 895.201(a) (West 2013). The San Antonio plan is required to make an
annual report to the governing body, but there is not any apparent requirement to disclose the
report to the public. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6243o, § 3.01(e) (West 2013).
190. FLA. STAT. § 112.66(1).
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Similarly, only two local funds in our study live up to the ideals of
the Clapman Report, which recommends that funds define and publish
their governance rules.191 Most plans do, however, disclose their
leadership structures.192 Only one local plan has any type of requirement
to report actual and potential conflicts.193
5. Funding Requirements
i. State Plans
While plan-funding requirements are perhaps not, strictly speaking,
a governance issue, they are intimately related to a plan’s ability to
achieve its goals. We found that employers for each of the state plans in
our study are statutorily required to make their annual contributions,194
although some statutes give their administrators more power to collect
those contributions than others. California has a unique constitutional
provision that gives the CALPERS board complete actuarial authority to
determine annual contributions,195 and the state statute requires the
legislature and the governor to fund the plan in accordance with the
CALPERS’ funding determination.196 Illinois TRS and Florida RS both
allow the automatic deduction of missed payments from any state
money being transferred to the employer.197 Ohio STRS and CALPERS
are able to charge penalties and interest for late payments, and
CALPERS is explicitly granted the right to recoup collection and legal
fees incurred during the collections process.198 New York State & Local
ERS requires payments to be made in full each fiscal year, but seems to
have no penalty for payments that are not made.199 Any member of
Washington PERS may sue to force employers to pay contributions.200
191. Only the Milwaukee and Philadelphia plans had public, easily accessible governance
rules.
192. For most of the plans, the plan’s leadership structure was easily accessible on the
plan’s website. This was not true for the Tampa plan (one of the well-funded plans in our study
group), and the leadership structure for the New York City plan was available, but only from
within the annual report.
193. SAN ANTONIO FIRE & POLICE PENSION FUND, STANDARDS OF CONDUCT, FINANCIAL
DISCLOSURE AND CONFLICTS DISCLOSURES 8 (2010), available at http://www.safireandpolice
pension.org/SSLFolder/pdf/BoardDisclosures%20FINAL.pdf.
194. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 20831 (2013); FLA. STAT. § 121.061(1); 40 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5 /
16-158 (2013); N.Y. RETIRE. & SOC. SEC. LAW § 23-a(b)(3) (McKinney 2013); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. 3307.28 (West 2013); WASH. REV. CODE § 41.50.120 (2013).
195. CAL. CONST. art. XVI, § 17(e).
196. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 20814(a).
197. See FLA. STAT. § 121.061(2)(b); 40 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5 / 16-158.1.
198. CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 20831, 20572(b); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3307.292; OHIO
ADMIN. CODE 3307-3-05 (2013).
199. N.Y. RETIRE. & SOC. SEC. LAW § 23-a(b)(3).
200. WASH. REV. CODE § 41.45.050(3); see Retired Pub. Emps. Council of Wash. v.
Charles, 62 P.3d 470, 483 (Wash. 2003) (holding that retirees and employees have vested
contractual rights to the systematic funding of the retirement system to maintain actuarial
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Funding requirements are often only as good as the actuarial
assumptions that are used to calculate funding needs. In this regard, the
Model Act requires that the trustees of public pension plans use
“reasonable actuarial factors” to determine the adequacy of funding.201
While each of the state plans in our study rely on actuaries to calculate
contribution rates and funded status, none of them are subject to a
requirement that the actuarial assumptions used be reasonable.202
Examining whether the plans in our study made the ARC as
calculated pursuant to Government Accounting Standards Board
(GASB) Statement Number 25 gives us a mixed picture of the states’
funding record.203 Among our well-funded plans, only one made annual
contributions that were equal to or exceeded 100% of the ARC for each
of the past five years.204 The same was true of our underfunded plans,
with only one making the full ARC.205 The other two underfunded plans
in our study made contributions significantly below the ARC.206

soundness). Washington PERS is also entitled to charge interest and fees on late contributions,
but only for employers that are not political subdivisions of the state. WASH. REV. CODE
§ 41.40.048(3).
201. UNIF. MGMT. OF PUB. EMP. RET. SYS. ACT § 8(a)(1)(F) (1997), available at
http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/management_public_employee_retirement_systems/m
persa_final_97.pdf.
202. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 20227; FLA. STAT. § 121.192; 40 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5 / 16-176;
N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit 11, § 136-2.6 (2013); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3307.51(A);
WASH. REV. CODE § 41.45.030(1).
203. Note that the annual required contribution calculated under GASB Statement Number
25 may be different than the required contribution calculated by the plan’s actuaries pursuant to
the plan’s funding provisions. GOV’T ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., SUMMARY OF STATEMENT
NO. 25 (1994), available at http://www.gasb.org/cs/ContentServer?c=Pronouncement_
C&pagename=GASB%2FPronouncement_C%2FGASBSummaryPage&cid=1176156677465.
204. California was the only state to make all required annual contributions, although it did
so only for the main “Public Employees Retirement Fund” and not the judicial retirement plans.
CAL. PUB. EMPS. RET. SYS., COMPREHENSIVE ANNUAL FINANCIAL REPORT 72 (2011),
http://www.calpers.ca.gov/eip-docs/about/pubs/comprehensive-annual-fina-report-2011.pdf.
Florida did not make the full amount of its annual required contributions over the most recent
five years. THE FLA. RET. SYS., ANNUAL REPORT 40 (2011), https://www.rol.frs.state.fl.us/
forms/2010-11_Annual_Report.pdf. Florida did, however, contribute more than 100% in some
of the most recent five years. Id. Washington made the full annual required contributions only
for the Law Enforcement Officers & Fire Fighters Plan 2, but not for any of its other plans.
WASH. STATE DEPT. OF RET. SYS., COMPREHENSIVE ANNUAL FINANCIAL REPORT 78 (2013),
http://drs.wa.gov/administration/annual-report/cafr.
205. N.Y. STATE & LOCAL RET. SYS., 2012 COMPREHENSIVE ANNUAL FINANCIAL REPORT
55 (2012), http://www.osc.state.ny.us/retire/word_and_pdf_documents/publications/cafr/cafr_
12.pdf.
206. TEACHERS’ RET. SYS. OF THE STATE OF ILL., COMPREHENSIVE ANNUAL FINANCIAL
REPORT FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDED JUNE 30, 2011, at 51 (2011),
http://trs.illinois.gov/pubs/cafr/FY2011/fy11cafr.pdf; STATE TEACHERS RET. SYS. OF OHIO,
COMPREHENSIVE ANNUAL FINANCIAL REPORT 22 (2011), https://www.strsoh.org/_pdfs/
annualreports/cafrs/2011_cafr.pdf.
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ii. Local Plans
The municipal plans in our study all contain requirements related to
annual employer contributions. One of the well-funded plans, San
Antonio, has funding rates that are not actuarially determined, but rather
are set by state statute.207 The remaining five plans all appear to require
annual, actuarially determined contributions, albeit with specifics that
differ as to how such amounts are determined.208 Milwaukee in fact
goes even further, and requires the city to contribute not only the normal
cost of benefits but also any additional amount necessary to get the plan
above 100% funded.209 The city council (referred to in Milwaukee as
the “Common Council”) even has the power to implement a dedicated
tax if necessary to obtain the required funds.210 Importantly, not a single
municipal plan in our study contained any “reasonableness”
requirement with respect to actuarial factors.
The State of Florida has a constitutional provision that prohibits
increases in public employee pension benefits unless the governmental
unit that employs the individuals has made or concurrently makes
provision for funding the increase on a sound actuarial basis.211 This
funding requirement applies to the Tampa plan, a well-funded plan
included in our study.212
Our municipal plans have a mixed record with respect to making the
full amount of ARCs calculated pursuant to GASB Statement Number
25. One well-funded plan has made 100% of the ARCs for the last five
years,213 while another well-funded plan did not do so only because
local law requires that contributions cease when the plan is fully
funded.214 We were unable to determine whether the third well-funded
plan made its ARCs because such information is not readily available to
the public.215 Of the three relatively poorly funded plans, two out of
three made their full ARCs in each of the most recent five years.216
207. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6243o, §§ 4.04–.05 (West 2013).
208. See infra App. B.
209. MILWAUKEE, WIS., CITY CHARTER § 36-08-6 (2011).
210. Id. at § 36-08-6(f).
211. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 14.
212. See 1945 Fla. Laws, ch. 23559, § 6(A) (amended 2011).
213. SAN ANTONIO FIRE & POLICE PENSION FUND, ACTUARIAL REPORT 28 (2011),
http://www.safppf.org/Rpt_AnnualReports.aspx?RepFolder=Sept302011.
214. See EMPLOYEES’ RET. SYS. OF THE CITY OF MILWAUKEE, ACTUARIAL VALUATION
REPORT 30 (2012), http://www.cmers.com/CMERS/Reports/Actuary/2012.pdf (showing
contribution percentages); MILWAUKEE, WIS., CITY CHARTER § 36-08-6-A2 (requiring zero
annual contributions for years when the city retirement plan is fully funded).
215. See 1945 Fla. Laws, ch. 23559, § 6(A) (amended 2011).
216. See N.Y.C. TEACHERS’ RET. SYS., 94TH ANNUAL REPORT 73 (2012),
https://www.trsnyc.org/WebContent/tools/brochure/annualReport2011.pdf (showing 100% of
ARCs were made from 2006–2011); CITY OF PHILADELPHIA MUNICIPAL RET. SYS., ACTUARIAL
VALUATION AS OF JULY 1, 2010 50 (2011), http://www.phila.gov/pensions/pdfs/
2010_Philly_AVR_0321.pdf (showing contributions less than 100% of ARC for the past eight
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6. Enforcement
One clear finding of our study is that enforcement of plan
governance provisions is perhaps the most difficult piece of the public
plan governance equation. The Model Act contains detailed provisions
regarding the standard to which fiduciaries should be held accountable,
whether trustees should be able to insure against personal liability, who
can file suit to enforce plan governance provisions, and the remedies
available in such suits.217 This subsection first details the governance
provisions relevant to enforcement before examining lawsuits in the
relevant states that sought to enforce either funding requirements or
fiduciary duties.
i. State Plans
a. Statutory Provisions Establishing Liability
Very few plans in our study contain liability provisions that are
anywhere near as detailed as the Model Act. Three of the state plans in
our sample—one relatively well funded and two relatively poorly
funded—explicitly allow either participants218 or state residents219 to
maintain an action for injunctive or equitable relief to enforce the act.
Two of the three plans that do not explicitly allow for suits to enforce
the act do explicitly allow the board to be sued and do not shield them
from liability, suggesting that plan participants would be able to bring
suit to enforce the act in those states as well.220 Only Washington PERS,
a well-funded plan, is silent on suing the board to enforce the act.221 In
three of the states that allow suits, the trustee or fiduciary sued may be
held personally liable, but California and Illinois either cap liability or
allow for indemnification (Ohio is silent on both).222 Florida RS and
years); STATE-BOSTON RETIREMENT SYSTEM, DECEMBER 31, 2010 FINANCIAL STATEMENTS AND
REQUIRED SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION 19 (2011), http://www.cityofboston.gov/Images_
Documents/12388State-Boston-FS-1210-FINAL_tcm3-29473.pdf (showing at least 100% of
ARC made in years 2005–2010).
217. See UNIF. MGMT. OF PUB. EMP. RET. SYS. ACT § 8(a)(1)(F) (1997), available at
http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/management_public_employee_retirement_systems/m
persa_final_97.pdf.
218. 40 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5 / 1-115, 16-171 (2013).
219. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 91003(a) (2013); N.Y. STATE FIN. LAW § 123-b(1) (McKinney
2013).
220. See FLA. STAT. § 112.66(6) (2013) (establishing liability for the governmental entity
responsible for operation of the retirement system); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3307.03 (West
2013) (noting that the board may sue and be sued).
221. WASH. REV. CODE § 43.33A.070 (2013).
222. See CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 91003.5–91005.5 (West 2013) (capping liability); 40 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 5 / 1-107, -114 (2013) (allowing indemnification unless the violation was willful or
the result of gross negligence and setting up liability for the breach of fiduciary duty with
respect to a retirement system or pension fund); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3307.181 (explaining
duties and liabilities of fiduciaries).
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New York State & Local ERS are silent on who can enforce the act
beyond members of the board, and Washington PERS only allows the
board to dismiss the violator, and specifically immunizes board
members from liability for the actions of other board members.223
Florida, though silent on who can enforce the act, is the only plan in our
state sample that specifically voids any agreements limiting fiduciary
liability as contrary to public policy.224 All state plans except
Washington PERS and New York State & Local ERS explicitly allow225
or require226 the plan to be insured against damage arising out of a
breach of duty owed by a trustee or fiduciary. Nevertheless, perhaps the
most interesting finding of our entire governance study is that, for all of
the work that goes into discussing and creating well-thought-out
governance provisions, these provisions appear to almost never be
enforced, as the next subsection details further.
b. Funding Lawsuits
As noted above, all of the plans in our study are subject to annual
funding requirements, although with different levels of enforceability.
For example, in Ohio, the State Retirement System Board may sue
employers for failing to pay their contributions and collect past-due
amounts.227 In Washington, plan members also have standing to sue.228
Our review of case law illustrates that these funding requirements
can very rarely be effectively enforced. For example, Illinois TRS, one
of the most underfunded plans in the country, has a long history of
successfully fending off participant lawsuits to increase the level of
contributions to their plan. In 1973, the Illinois Court of Claims held
that the State of Illinois owed over $2 billion in missed contributions to
Illinois TRS.229 However, when the legislature passed bills
appropriating amounts towards the missed contributions, the Governor
used his line-item veto power to reduce the amount of the
appropriations.230 Pensioners sued to collect the full amount
223. See FLA. STAT. § 112.66(4) (setting out general provisions relating to the
administration of any retirement system or plan); WASH. REV. CODE § 43.33A.070 (noting that
board members will not be liable for the violations of other board members); WASH. ADMIN.
CODE § 287-04-039 (2013) (allowing for dismissal). See generally N.Y. RETIRE. & SOC. SEC.
§§ 1–119 (2013).
224. FLA. STAT. § 112.66(4).
225. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 7511(a)–(b); FLA. STAT. §§ 112.656(3), 111.072.
226. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3307.181(E).
227. See State ex rel. Ret. Bd. of State Teachers’ Ret. Sys. v. Kurtz, 144 N.E. 120, 121, 125
(Ohio 1924) (holding that a statute requiring employer contribution to state teachers’ retirement
system is valid).
228. See Retired Pub. Emps.’ Council of Wash. v. Charles, 62 P.3d 470, 488 (Wash. 2002)
(holding that retirees and employees “have standing to seek a writ of mandamus to compel the
transfer and payment of funds”).
229. Ill. Educ. Ass’n v. State, 28 Ill. Ct. Cl. 379, 389 (1973).
230. People ex rel. Ill. Fed’n of Teachers v. Lindberg, 326 N.E.2d 749, 751 (Ill. 1975).
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appropriated under the nonimpairment clause of the Illinois
Constitution, but the court held that the clause did not give pensioners a
contractual right to a specific level of plan funding—only to the benefits
they receive upon retirement.231
Similarly, in 1993 when the Illinois General Assembly essentially
refinanced their unfunded pension obligations by extending the period
over which they were amortized by thirteen years, pensioners sued and
claimed it weakened the plan’s funding status.232 In that case the court
held that not only did they not have a right to a specific level of funding,
but also the only change to funding formulas they could challenge is
one that put the plan in imminent danger of bankruptcy.233 Even when
the funding levels enacted by the legislature and accepted by the
governor were not being followed, the court held that Illinois pensioners
could not require the collection of state contributions.234 In light of this
case law, perhaps it is not surprising that Illinois pensions are so
underfunded.
In contrast, in the early 1990s, the California legislature made a
series of changes to the way it funded the California Public Employees’
Retirement Fund. Initially, contributions were made on a monthly basis,
which was changed to quarterly, then semiannually, then semiannually
in arrears, then annually in arrears.235 The Board of California PERS
challenged the “in arrears” financing as an unconstitutional impairment
of contract because of the lost interest that would have accrued if the
payments were made when due, rather than in arrears.236 The court held
that the lost interest due to in arrears funding amounted to an
unconstitutional impairment of contract, and that California “PERS
members have a contractual right to an actuarially sound retirement
system.”237 Washington courts have similarly held that public plan
participants have a right to a plan funded on an actuarially sound
231. Id. at 753–54.
232. McNamee v. State, 672 N.E.2d 1159, 1160 (Ill. 1996).
233. Id. at 1166.
234. See People ex rel. Sklodowski v. State, 695 N.E.2d 374, 376, 379 (Ill. 1998).
Sklodowski has been followed by subsequent funding cases for relatively poorly funded Illinois
plans outside of our sample. See, e.g., Houlihan v. City of Chicago, 714 N.E.2d 569, 575 (Ill.
1999) (“The City argues that the Illinois Supreme Court’s recent decision in Sklodowski is
instructive on this issue. We agree.”).
235. Bd. of Admin. of the Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Wilson, 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d 207, 213 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1997).
236. Id. at 214.
237. Id. The California Teachers’ Retirement Fund—a relatively well-funded plan outside
of our sample—encountered a similar situation in 2003. Teachers’ Ret. Bd. v. Genest, 65 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 326, 330 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007). The state legislature, in a time of fiscal tumult, passed a
bill that reduced the state’s statutory obligation to fund an account of the Teachers’ Retirement
Fund. Id. The statutory language obliging the state to fund the account included a statement that
the legislature intended the funding commitment to be a contractually enforceable promise. Id.
at 332. The Teachers’ Retirement Board successfully sued to reinstate payments, with interest,
despite the fact that the fund was actuarially sound. Id. at 350–51.
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basis.238
When New York was faced with a budget crisis, the state changed
the method of funding pension benefits from the aggregate cost method
(which funds some benefits before they accrue) to the projected unit
credit method (which funds benefits only when they accrue).239 This
change was designed to save employers money on contributions the first
few years after the switch, after which contribution rates would
significantly increase.240 In this case, employees were successfully able
to challenge the change in funding method as a violation of their
contractual rights because it divested the State Comptroller of discretion
over which method to use for the plans.241 When the funding method
was changed back to the aggregate cost method, it resulted in state
employers being behind on the contributions they should have been
making.242 But rather than appropriate the amount of missed
contributions, the legislature ordered that missed payments be collected
out of the supplemental reserve fund, out of which supplemental
allowances are paid to retirees.243
Again participants sued and were successful in overturning this act
of the legislature as a violation of their contractual pension rights
because it infringed on the Comptroller’s freedom to manage the funds
in the manner he considered to be most fiscally appropriate.244 But
when the plan found itself overfunded in the late 1990s, the legislature
provided that administrative costs would be paid out of the fund
provided it did not result in the plan being underfunded.245 The court
upheld that change, as the Comptroller never had discretion over how
administrative costs were paid, and no benefits were reduced.246
c. Fiduciary Lawsuits
Our research indicates that the states in our study group were very
rarely sued regarding their investment decisions or other alleged
breaches of fiduciary duties. We located one case that alleged New
York had used pension plan assets to assist the City of New York in

238. See Weaver v. Evans, 496 P.2d 639, 649–50 (Wash. 1972) (holding that Washington
pensioners have a vested right “to a retirement system actuarially designed through systematic
funding to meet present and future pension liabilities”); see also Retired Pub. Emps. Council of
Wash. v. Charles, 62 P.3d 470, 483 (Wash. 2003) (applying the holding of Weaver to
Washington PERS).
239. McDermott v. Regan, 624 N.E.2d 985, 986–87 (N.Y. 1993).
240. Id. at 989–90.
241. See id. (holding that there is a “contractual relationship between the employee and the
retirement system in which benefits cannot be diminished or impaired”).
242. McCall v. State, 219 A.D.2d 135, 138–39 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996).
243. Id.
244. See id. at 140.
245. Guzdek v. McCall, 749 N.Y.S.2d 827, 830 (2002).
246. See id. at 835.
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escaping potential bankruptcy.247 In response to the New York City
budget crisis of the 1970s, the state legislature established a Municipal
Assistance Corporation to act as a financing intermediary for the city.248
They then passed a law authorizing and requiring the State Comptroller
to purchase Municipal Assistance Corporation bonds for the pension
fund.249 The court struck down the requirement (but upheld the
authorization) to purchase such bonds as an impairment of pension
benefits because it infringed on the Comptroller’s discretion in
managing the funds.250 In so doing, the court stated that “neither
plaintiffs nor the courts . . . are entitled . . . to assess the market
worthiness of securities in which the State Comptroller may invest.”251
When the Comptroller purchased the bonds at par from the Municipal
Assistance Corporation instead of on the open market where they were
trading for a 20% discount, the court again stated that it was not entitled
to assess the market worthiness of the securities.252
d. Other Enforcement Actions
Both New York and Illinois have had problems with pay-for-play
scandals in the past decade, where high-level administrators of public
funds were requiring kickbacks to place business with various
investment firms.253 These cases were criminal in nature, and therefore
did not involve participant lawsuits.

247. Sgaglione v. Levitt, 337 N.E.2d 337, 594 (N.Y. 1975).
248. See N.Y. RETIRE. & SOC. SEC. LAW § 179 (McKinney 2013) (noting the obligation of
the Municipal Assistance Corporation).
249. Sgaglione, 337 N.E.2d at 594.
250. See id. at 599.
251. Id. at 595.
252. Tron v. Condello, 427 F. Supp. 1175, 1181 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). The court also stated that
the plan participants should seek remedy in a state tort action for breach of fiduciary duty. Id. at
1190. However, that would have likely been unsuccessful in light of another provision passed by
the legislature stating that the purchase of Municipal Assistance Corporation bonds was prudent,
would not be a breach of fiduciary duty, and would not otherwise give rise to liability. N.Y.
RETIRE. & SOC. SEC. LAW § 179.
253. See, e.g., Press Release, Teachers’ Retirement System of the State of Illinois, TRS
Reacts to Levin Plea; Pledges Continuing Cooperation in Finding, Punishing Wrongdoers (Oct.
27, 2006); Danny Hakim, Former Hevesi Aide Pleads Guilty in Pension Case, N.Y. TIMES (Mar.
10, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/11/nyregion/11pension.html (recounting a pension
plan scandal in New York); Danny Hakim & Louise Story, Hevesi Adviser in Pension Scandal
Makes Deal to Plead Guilty to Felony, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 4, 2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/05/nyregion/05morris.html (same); Karen Freifeld, Ex-New
York Official Hevesi Gets Up To 4 Years In Prison For Pay-To-Play, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 15,
2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-04-15/hevesi-gets-up-to-four-years-in-prison-innew-york-state-pension-scandal.html (same); Ray Long & James Kimberly, Teachers Pension
Sues 3 in Scandal, CHI. TRIB. (Jan. 6, 2006), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2006-0106/news/0601060231 (recounting a pension plan scandal in Chicago).
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ii. Local Plans
a. Statutory Provisions Establishing Liability
The municipal plans in our study fall far short of the Model Act
ideals with respect to establishing trustee liability. The Act, for
example, is explicit that a trustee’s decision should be evaluated at the
time the decision is made, and not with the benefit of hindsight.254 None
of the municipal plans contain a similar provision. Two plans, each well
performing, do contain the Model Act provision that trustee decisions
will be evaluated in the context of the portfolio as a whole, and not in
isolation.255
The plans are lacking in establishing not only the standards that
apply to trustee decisions but also the type of liability trustees can face,
and whether such liability can be insured against. Just one plan, from
the poorly funded group, contains the Model Act provision that
explicitly states that trustees are personally liable to the system for any
breaches of fiduciary duty.256 Only one plan, which is well funded,
provides that any agreement attempting to limit fiduciary liability is
void.257 Two well-funded plans have specific provisions allowing the
plan to insure itself against liability or loss resulting from a breach of
fiduciary duty,258 while two different plans specifically provide that
trustees may be indemnified for some liabilities arising from the
performance of their duties.259
Importantly, only two plans (one well funded and one poorly
funded) explicitly allow participants, beneficiaries, or fiduciaries to
maintain a cause of action against plan fiduciaries to enforce plan

254. UNIF. MGMT. OF PUB. EMP. RET. SYS. ACT § 7(3) (1997), available at
http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/management_public_employee_retirement_systems/m
persa_final_97.pdf.
255. See, e.g., MILWAUKEE, WIS., CITY CHARTER § 36-09.1.d-1 (2013) (noting that
investment and managing decisions must be evaluated in the context of the trust portfolio as a
whole); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6243o, § 7.04(b) (West 2013) (noting that when
determining whether the board exercised prudence concerning an investment decision, the
investment of all assets of the fund will be considered).
256. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 32, § 24(2) (2013) (establishing that any person who
willfully or neglectfully breaches their fiduciary duty will be personally liable).
257. See FLA. STAT. § 112.66(4) (2013) (“Any provision in a legal agreement, contract, or
instrument which purports to relieve a fiduciary of a retirement system or plan from
responsibility or liability is void as being against public policy.”).
258. See id. § 112.656(3) (allowing purchase of insurance to cover liability or losses from a
fiduciary’s actions or omissions); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6243o, § 3.01(a) (West 2013)
(same).
259. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 32, §§ 20A, 20B (allowing indemnification of trustees for
certain liabilities arising out of their acts); MILWAUKEE, WIS., CITY CHARTER ch. 36-15.1.e-4,
available at http://city.milwaukee.gov/ordinances (last visited Nov. 10, 2013) (requiring
indemnification of trustees for certain liabilities arising of their acts).

1358

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66

provisions or to redress a violation of fiduciary duties.260
b. Enforcement Actions
The municipal plans in our study have been subject to even fewer
enforcement actions than the state plans. Of the six municipal plans
studied, only two have been subject to lawsuits challenging an
investment decision. Relatively poorly funded plans were at the center
of each lawsuit and neither was successful.261 One of these plans, the
Philadelphia Pension System, was also at the center of a successful
lawsuit compelling the city government to fund the plan to maintain its
actuarial soundness.262 No other plan was subject to a lawsuit
challenging either the government’s responsibility to fund the plan or
the board’s management of plan assets.263
Examining the two investment lawsuits helps illustrate why these
types of lawsuits are in fact quite rare. In the first case, which involved
the same basic facts as the New York State pension cases described
above, New York’s municipal pensions purchased bonds from New
York City during the city’s fiscal crisis, as directed by state statute.264
When the Teachers’ Retirement System of the City of New York sued
over these purchases, a federal court held that there was no breach of
fiduciary duty because the purchase of the securities at above-market
value was necessary to keep the Teachers’ Retirement System
solvent.265 The court reasoned that New York City was the largest
contributor to the system and would likely stop payments in bankruptcy,
which would eventually cause the system to become insolvent.266
Additionally, the system was viewed as the “lender of last resort” for
New York City.267 Thus, the court found that the perceived immediate
and unavoidable threat to the system’s solvency made the purchase
decision a prudent one.268
In the second case, a public employee union sued the City of
260. See FLA. STAT. § 112.66(5) (allowing a member or beneficiary of a retirement system
or plan to enforce their rights and recover benefits due); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 32, § 24(1)
(allowing any interested party to “compel the observance and to restrain the violation of any
provisions in the plan”).
261. See Withers v. Teachers’ Ret. Sys., 447 F. Supp. 1248, 1259 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (holding
that since trustees’ investment decisions rested on firm ground, there was no breach of a
fiduciary duty).
262. See Dombrowski v. City of Philadelphia, 245 A.2d 238, 239–40 (Pa. 1968).
263. On the other end of the spectrum, one well-funded municipal fund sued the city
treasurer, who had failed to follow the Board’s investment direction. See Bolen v. Bd. of
Firemen, Policemen & Fire Alarm Operators’ Tr., 308 S.W.2d 904, 904–05 (Tex. Civ. App.
1957).
264. Withers, 447 F. Supp. at 1250.
265. Id. at 1256.
266. Id.
267. Id. at 1252.
268. Id. at 1259.
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Philadelphia attempting to enjoin the city’s retirement plan from
purchasing short-term bonds from the financially distressed city.269 It is
easy to understand the union’s objection. If the city was in such poor
financial shape that there was not a market for its short-term bonds,
presumably employees and retirees would not want their retirement
assets invested in such funds. From a fiduciary perspective, the bond
purchase appears to be a clear breach of fiduciary duty, as it was not
undertaken solely in the interests of plan participants and beneficiaries.
Rather, the city appeared to be using retirement plan assets in order to
benefit the city itself. The trial court, in an unpublished decision, denied
the injunction, and the plan purchased the bonds.270 The union appealed
the trial court’s decision, but by the time the appellate court heard the
appeal, the city had repaid the bonds, rendering the issue moot.271
In contrast, during the 1960s the City of Philadelphia made
contributions to its pension system that did not cover the system’s
normal cost, allowing its unfunded accrued liability to grow.272 A
participant in the system sued to require Philadelphia to contribute
sufficient amounts to make up the shortfall.273 Philadelphia’s Home
Rule Charter required the pension system to be actuarially sound, and
all experts agreed that the contributions made were “insufficient to
maintain the retirement system in an actuarially sound condition.”274
The trial court ordered Philadelphia to make missed payments, and the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court, over the dissent of one justice,
affirmed.275 Nevertheless, Philadelphia’s plan today is among the worst
funded municipal plans in the country, likely because state law now
allows the plan to make annual contributions that do not cover the
plan’s normal cost or unfunded liabilities.276
Litigation, of course, is not the only means to enforce governance
provisions. We also searched news reports to determine if any
governance issues were resolved through more informal means. The
results, however, were not much different than our litigation searches.
For the municipal plans studied, we found no indication that board
actions were ever subject to public scrutiny. Our news searches did
indicate that each of the three well-funded local plans had taken action

269. Phila. Lodge No. 5, Fraternal Order of Police v. Phila. Bd. of Pensions and Ret., 606
A.2d 603, 604–05 (Pa. 1992).
270. Id. at 605.
271. Id.
272. Dombrowski v. City of Philadelphia, 245 A.2d 238, 239–40 (Pa. 1968).
273. Id. at 240.
274. Id. at 239–40.
275. Id. at 251.
276. For an overview of Philadelphia’s pension problems, see Patrick Kerkstra, Moral
Hazards: Philadelphia’s Ongoing Pension Crisis, PHILA. MAG. (Apr. 27, 2012),
http://www.phillymag.com/articles/philadelphias-ongoing-pension-crisis.
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themselves to deal with subpar investment managers or investments.277
Only one of the poorly funded plans had similar news reports.278
III. KEY FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATIONS
Our study suggests some serious shortcomings in public plan
governance. Very few plans appear to follow best practices and, even
where they do, our study does not suggest a correlation between such
practices and the funded status of a plan.279 We are careful, however,
not to infer too much from this lack of an apparent correlation, as our
study was not designed to empirically test the correlation between
governance and funded status. It may be that a correlation would be
found if a broader sample of funds were studied. It may also be the case
that a correlation could become apparent if slow growth or our current
low-interest rate environment continues for several more years, further
eroding funding ratios.
Our work shows that both state and local governance provisions are
generally less detailed than those required by expert recommendations.
For example, none of the plans require trustees to act in accordance with
a good-faith interpretation of law (though one municipal plan contains a
similar provision).280 Also, none of the plans require trustees to use
reasonable actuarial factors to determine funding needs. However, an
analysis of these two examples of omissions shows that their practical
impact varies significantly with the specific provision.
The first example of an omission—failing to affirmatively state that
trustees must act in accordance with a good-faith interpretation of the
law—likely has a very minor impact on fund performance. Trustees are
already bound by the duty of prudence, which requires trustees to act as
a prudent person would act in like circumstances. The requirement to
act in accordance with a good-faith interpretation of applicable law
likely falls under the duty of prudence. Therefore this omission from
277. See, e.g., Arnella J. Ford, San Antonio 911 Drops Capital Guardian, INVESTMENT
MGMT. WKLY. (Thomson Corp., New York, N.Y.), Oct. 18, 2004, available at
http://connection.ebscohost.com/c/articles/14748574 (reporting that a pension fund terminated
its investment manager); Alliance on Hot Seat at Tampa Employees, MONEY MGMT. LETTER
(Game Grp. Inc., New York, N.Y.), July 7, 2003 (reporting that a fund kept a close eye on its
investment manager for performance reasons); Cary Spivak & Dan Bice, City Consultants Fired
as Billing Is Investigated, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, July 10, 2003, at 2A, available at
http://news.google.com/newspapers?id=srIaAAAAIBAJ&sjid=SkQEAAAAIBAJ&pg=5959%2
C6007106 (reporting that a fund filed a white-collar allegation complaint against its investment
management firm).
278. See Alternatives Briefs, 39 PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS, Mar. 21, 2011, at 28 (reporting
that the Boston plan terminated an investment manager due to suboptimal performance).
279. This finding is perhaps not too surprising, given that the two states that have adopted
the Model Act do not have plans that are among the best-funded in the country. See PEW
CENTER ON THE STATES, supra note 4, at 5 (finding that Wyoming’s pensions are 86% funded,
while Maryland’s are 64% funded); ENACTMENT STATUS MAP, supra note 14, at 2 (showing that
Maryland and Wyoming are the two states that have adopted the Model Act).
280. N.Y.C., N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 13-508.
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plans’ governance rules is not terribly troubling. This same analysis is
likely true of other common omissions as well, such as failing to state
that trustees shall take into account general economic conditions,
liquidity needs, or inflation in making investment decisions.
But the second example of an omission—failing to state that the plan
must use reasonable actuarial factors to determine plan-funding needs—
could have a tremendous impact on a plan’s financial health. Obviously,
allowing the use of unreasonable actuarial factors could cause a plan to
be systemically underfunded. And it is less clear in this situation that
any of the broader fiduciary duties would adequately protect against the
use of unreasonable factors. Given the complex nature of actuarial
calculations, it may be prudent for a trustee to merely rely on an
actuary’s assertion that the factors used are reasonable. Actuaries are, of
course, subject to professional standards that may limit their discretion
in determining actuarial factors, but it is not clear that those standards
are specific enough to completely safeguard against systemic
underfunding.281
Even if professional actuarial standards did adequately constrain the
use of improper actuarial factors when followed, the failure to state an
affirmative duty for trustees to ensure that reasonable actuarial factors
are used would still make it more difficult for an interested party to
enforce the use of reasonable factors. Without an affirmative trustee
duty, a participant concerned about improper actuarial factors would
have to show that a prudent trustee would have questioned the hired
actuary’s assumptions, under a lay person standard. That cause of action
will likely be much more difficult to establish than establishing that the
trustees failed in their affirmative duty to use reasonable factors. There
is in fact anecdotal evidence that plans do manipulate actuarial factors
in order to “address” underfunding—for example by raising the plan’s
investment return assumptions.282
The other common omission from our studied plans’ governance
provisions that may be problematic is their silence on consideration of
an investment’s collateral benefits. Recall that consideration of
collateral benefits goes to the heart of one of the main criticisms of
public plans—that they may invest money in a manner that is not in the
best interest of plan participants and beneficiaries in order to secure
political gain. It is possible that a court would find that the duty of
281. See AMERICAN ACADEMY OF ACTUARIES, YEARBOOK AND LEADERSHIP MANUAL 2009
70–73 (2009), available at http://www.actuary.org/files/yearbook09_0.pdf; see also supra note
28 and accompanying text. In the current low-interest-rate environment, it may be unreasonable
to base expected return on the returns achieved over the past few decades, which have benefitted
from financial market deregulation and a significant tech boom. Nonetheless, this is the method
used by many actuaries.
282. See, e.g., Eaton & Nofsinger, supra note 75, at 161 (finding that plans subject to
political pressure are “likely to have optimistic accounting assumptions and to be more
underfunded than those plans not facing political pressure”).
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loyalty or the duty of prudence prohibits trustees from selecting an
investment with collateral benefits unless the investment would be
chosen absent those benefits, but that outcome is not certain in the
absence of a specific provision.
Even with these important omissions in pension plan governance
provisions, we believe that our most important finding is that plan
funding and governance provisions are very rarely enforced, a
phenomenon previously unrecognized in the literature on this topic.
Revisiting the two types of enforcement actions from our study will
help to illustrate this point. The first type of enforcement action in our
study was lawsuits to enforce plan-funding requirements. In one such
case, the Illinois Teachers’ Retirement System was being systemically
underfunded and participants brought suit to try to force the state to
adequately fund the plan. Even though participants had a specific,
constitutional right to their pension benefits, Illinois courts held that
they do not have the right to an adequately funded plan. As a result,
participants were essentially helpless to prevent the significant
underfunding that exists in the Illinois Teachers’ plan today.
Participants in that state can sue only when the plan actually runs out of
money to pay benefits. This lack of enforcement gives states the clear
ability to act on their inclination to favor current needs over retirees’
benefit security. The only possible method by which to avoid such a
situation is for participants and beneficiaries to exert political power to
force adequate funding, but experience shows that in many instances
participants and beneficiaries do not wield the necessary amount of
power to safeguard their benefits. Before moving on to the next
example, it is important to note that a state is able to change this
outcome. A state could pass a law or amend its constitution to provide
that participants have the right to a plan that is adequately funded on an
annual basis. We also saw in our study that state courts have in some
instances inferred such a right, even in the absence of a specific
statutory or constitutional provision.283
The second type of enforcement action was lawsuits challenging
plan investment decisions. Note at the outset that both of the cases of
this type identified by our study were high-profile situations where plan
assets were being used to directly help a financially distressed
municipality. This suggests, perhaps, that investment decisions are not
generally closely monitored, but rather are challenged only where there
is a highly publicized investment decision that appears to clearly violate
a fiduciary duty. Also important to note is that these cases, even when
they present facts that suggest a clear breach of fiduciary duty, are
difficult to win. In the New York case, where plan assets were being
used to buy bonds at above-market prices in order to help bail out New
283. See Bd. of Admin. of the Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Wilson, 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d 207, 223–
26 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997).
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York City, the court refused to second-guess the investment decision.
And in Philadelphia, where plan assets were being used for a similar
purpose, the court did not decide the issue until after the bonds had been
repaid, rendering the issue moot according to the court.
Even if these courts had been willing to examine the merits of the
underlying investments, it is not necessarily the case that the plaintiffs
would have been successful. Generally speaking, where there is a
breach of fiduciary duty we look to see whether the trust beneficiaries
have suffered any loss as a result.284 In the context of challenged
investment decisions, that typically involves comparing the investment
results under the offending investment to that which would have been
undertaken in the absence of the breach.285 This has several effects.
First, trustees are essentially permitted to gamble with plan assets. If
they make local investments in breach of their fiduciary duties, but the
investment is successful, there is no liability for the initial action.
Second, investment decisions are very difficult to monitor. An
interested party would not only need to establish that the trustee made
an improper investment decision at the outset but also that the rate of
return that was achieved on the investment was less than it would have
been in the absence of the breach. Establishing both of these facts is
intensive, and unlikely to be undertaken by participants who would get
no benefit from such lawsuits other than a somewhat more secure
retirement benefit. Our two examples, then, paint a bleak picture for
public pension plans. In many states, plans can be systemically
underfunded and, even when adequately funded, it is unlikely that
trustee investment decisions are adequately monitored. Before
discussing possible methods to address the challenges inherent in public
plan governance, we first review the key differences our study found
between state and local plans.
A. Differences Between State and Local Governance
State and local plans are often not differentiated in policy
discussions. What our study suggests, however, is that their governance
provisions are remarkably different along some key metrics. One of the
most striking is that nearly every state plan included in our study
requires trustees to have investment expertise or be advised by those
with investment expertise, while no local plan contains similar
provisions. All of the states require the board to develop and publish a
set of investment objectives, consider the total return on investments,
and diversify unless clearly imprudent to do so. States also shield board
meetings from open meetings requirements when investment decisions
284. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 95 cmt. b (2012).
285. See Donovan v. Bierwirth, 754 F.2d 1049, 1056 (2d Cir. 1985) (holding that
compensation should be a comparison of what the plan earned on its investments with what the
plan would have earned had the funds been available for other purposes of the plan).
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are being considered. Significantly fewer municipal plans examined
require the same. Municipal plans, however, are much less likely to
have economically targeted or social investing requirements and much
less likely to have political-majority boards than our state plans. State
plans, on the other hand, have much more robust funding and
enforcement provisions, with more state plans creating personal liability
for trustees and allowing participants or residents to sue.
B. Solving the Enforcement Problem
Experts tend to agree broadly about what good governance looks like
in the context of public pension plans.286 Trustees who are relatively
isolated from the political process should govern plans. Individuals with
investment expertise and experience should be among the group of
trustees. Investment decisions should be made in the best interests of
plan participants and beneficiaries. Processes should be transparent, and
disclosures should be made to help interested parties monitor plan
trustees and investment performance. Plans should be adequately
funded on an ongoing basis so as not to burden future taxpayers. While
our study illustrates that many plans fail to live up to even these basic
provisions, it also shows that a plan’s governance provisions may only
be as good as its enforcement mechanisms.
Before we discuss possible solutions to the enforcement problem
that public pension plans present, it is important to note some
limitations of our enforcement hypothesis. While our intuition is that the
lack of enforcement is a significant cause of ineffectual governance,
there are other possible explanations as well. The first is simply that
good governance provisions do not materially impact a plan’s financial
health, even if we assume effective enforcement. In other words, there
may be other factors, such as the political climate in a state, that have
much more influence on a plan’s success than the content of its
governance rules. Another possibility is that a plan’s governance
provisions may be endogenous. A plan that is poorly funded may enact
governance reform to counteract the situation, while a well-funded plan
with poor governance provisions may not see any need to act. This may
explain the apparent lack of correlation that we see between funding and
governance provisions in our study. And finally, our relatively small
sample size makes it possible that our findings do not reflect the larger
state of public plan governance. Nevertheless, we explore in detail what
appears, on the basis of our findings, to be the most significant defect in
public pension plan governance—the lack of enforceability.
Part I outlined the reasons why it is both difficult to have an
286. See, e.g., UNIF. MGMT. OF PUB. EMP. RET. SYS. ACT (1997), available at
http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/management_public_employee_retirement_systems/m
persa_final_97.pdf (articulating a model law to tackle public plan governance focusing on
trustees’ fiduciary duties and need for public disclosure); CLAPMAN REPORT, supra note 15
(recommending best practices for pension funds).

2014]

WHO’S AFRAID OF GOOD GOVERNANCE?

1365

effective governance watchdog, and, even if an effective monitor exists,
to successfully pursue legal action to enforce governance rules. The
problem of inadequate governance provisions is easily solved so long as
there is political will to seek reform. What is less obvious is how to
solve the monitoring and enforcement problem.
Other commentators suggest solutions to the public pension plan
problem that are either broader than the pension problem itself, or that
require eliminating defined benefit pension plans. For example, as part
of the debate regarding whether states should have the ability to declare
bankruptcy, Professor David Skeel argues that the mere availability of
state bankruptcy as a possible option for fiscally distressed states may
help to solve the problem of underfunded pension promises.287 In
particular, if employees are aware that their pension benefits may be cut
back in bankruptcy, they may demand adequate funding.288 It is also
possible that the threat of bankruptcy may make state employees more
effective monitors of public pension funding and governance.289 And
while it would not automatically solve the enforcement problem,
employees concerned about a potential bankruptcy’s effect on their
pension benefits could lobby for legal changes that make both funding
and governance provisions readily enforceable. The availability of state
bankruptcy is obviously a solution that would affect far more than
pension funding and governance. As a result, while we note state
bankruptcy as a potential solution, we leave it to bankruptcy scholars to
debate its advisability.
Professor Roberta Romano suggests that the political economy of
public employee pensions is such that interests and incentives will
always be mismatched, and in her canonical article on the subject, she
reviews possible reforms designed to limit or eliminate the politicization
of public pension fund investments. She begins with perhaps the
simplest reform option: reforming the makeup of public pension boards
to include a greater number of independent trustees.290 She notes,
however, that it is not clear that doing so will in fact effectively remove
political influence from boards.291 She also examines whether
subjecting public funds to ERISA-like fiduciary requirements might
solve the problem.292 The Model Act, drafted after Romano’s article
was published, makes this solution one of its major reforms.293 Romano
points out that this, too, is an incomplete solution in that it would still
287. Skeel, supra note 8, at 692–94.
288. Id. at 693.
289. See id. (noting that a threat of bankruptcy would encourage state employees to act).
290. Romano, supra note 11, at 840–41.
291. Id. at 842.
292. Id. at 841–42.
293. UNIF. MGMT. OF PUB. EMP. RET. SYS. ACT prefatory note, at 1 (1997), available at
http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/management_public_employee_retirement_systems/m
persa_final_97.pdf.
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allow for conflicted decision makers—that is, under ERISA’s fiduciary
rules, plan sponsors are allowed to also serve as a fund’s investment
manager.294 She also examines whether mandating passive investment
strategies or constitutionalizing the independence of the fund’s board
might be effective reforms, and again finds both to be suboptimal
solutions.295
Professor Romano then turns to her final solution—moving public
retirement systems to a defined contribution plan design (i.e., some type
of individual account plan).296 She is clearly sensitive to the potential
weakness of defined contribution plans as they relate to employees’
retirement security, but nevertheless concludes that taking investment
control away from the plan’s trustees, and giving it instead to individual
employees, is the best way to prevent the many problems that stem from
the political control of pension assets.297 Professor Romano makes a
compelling case for this solution, and states would be wise to carefully
consider her arguments.
But as Professor Romano points out, there are real costs to
employees with respect to moving from a defined benefit plan to a
defined contribution plan.298 The most notable of these is the fact that,
as has been seen in the private sector, defined contribution plans rely on
employees to make optimal savings and investment decisions, and many
individuals are unable to do so.299 As a result, this Article does not wish
to simply reiterate Professor Romano’s proposal, but instead seeks to
examine possible reform options for states that wish to retain a defined
benefit pension plan. The alternatives explored below are all solutions
that would allow states and cities to maintain their defined benefit
pension plans, while creating both better incentives to monitor plan
funding and performance and near-term consequences if plans are
underfunded or underperform. By discussing these solutions, we do not
mean to imply that these proposals are necessarily politically viable.
Indeed, there is reason to suspect that many if not all of these proposals
would face significant political opposition. There is nevertheless value
in discussing potential solutions, for at the very least they help illustrate
the real trade-offs that must be made when benefit promises are not
adequately funded.

294. Romano, supra note 11, at 841–42.
295. Id. at 842–44.
296. Id. at 844.
297. Id. at 851.
298. Id. at 849, 851.
299. See, e.g., Jack VanDerhei, Retirement Income Adequacy for Boomers and Gen Xers:
Evidence from the 2012 EBRI Retirement Security Projection Model®, 32 EBRI NOTES 2, 2
(May 2012), available at http://ebri.org/pdf/notespdf/EBRI_Notes_05_May-12.RSPMER.Cvg1.pdf (finding that approximately 44% of Baby Boomers and members of Generation X
were at risk for inadequate income in retirement).
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1. Automatic Benefit Reductions
As previously mentioned, there are two fundamental problems with
respect to the enforcement of defined benefit plan governance
provisions. The first is the lack of direct harm that results to participants
if plans are not adequately funded on an ongoing basis or if investment
decisions deliver suboptimal results. The second is that any harm that
does result from underfunding or investment underperformance is
typically felt several years in the future, creating a significant temporal
disconnect. Public plan governance reform would ideally create
enforcement provisions that solved these two problems.
One potential method of doing so is to implement immediate
consequences that follow from a plan failing to meet specified funding
or investment performance targets. The law could provide, for example,
that if a trigger (such as underfunding or underperformance) occurs,
cost-of-living increases for current retirees will be suspended or benefit
payouts reduced by specified percentages. Alternatively, it could
provide that all future accruals are suspended until the problem is
rectified.300 This approach would create an enormous incentive for both
participants and retirees to closely monitor government actions with
respect to plan funding and investing. And it may help solve the current
temporal problem with respect to pension funding by making the
consequences felt now rather than thirty years in the future.
While such an approach might appear to be severe, it is attractive for
the very reason that it makes explicit the trade-offs that must be made if
plans are not adequately funded and invested. There are several ongoing
lawsuits challenging unilateral reductions in public plan benefits that
were justified by the relevant states as ways to address underfunding.301
Automatic benefit reductions would have the advantage of being
explicit about the unilateral reductions that will follow from
underfunding. It is possible, however, that in some states, courts would
hold that a law providing for such reductions is an impermissible
change to benefits, particularly if the law affected benefits that had
already been earned.302 In most states, however, it should be possible to
apply automatic benefit reductions prospectively, where only benefits

300. The term “future accruals” refers to pension benefits that have yet to be earned. A
participant’s accrued benefit is what they have earned to date—in other words what they would
be entitled to if they terminated employment as of today. Changes to future accruals affect only
benefits that are not yet earned, not a participant’s accrued benefit.
301. See, e.g., Justus v. Colorado, No. 2010CV-001589 (Dist. Ct. Colo. 2010), appeal
docketed; R.I. Council v. Chafee, No. 12-3168 (Sup. Ct. R.I. June 22, 2012), cert. denied.
302. The argument for such protection would be that employees enjoy contractual rights to
their pension benefits, and passing an automatic benefit reduction law that substantially impairs
those rights would be an unconstitutional impairment of contract.
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not yet earned would be affected. 303
Assuming that state law would permit the adoption of such
provisions, automatic reductions have the benefit of quickly putting
pensions back on course to complete funding. Rather than have
underfunding or underperformance persist for years and result in
lengthy and uncertain litigation, automatic reductions would clarify the
results that follow from suboptimal funding and underperformance, and
likely would create significant political pressure on the state to live up
to their benefit promises.
2. Automatic Tax Increases
If one did not want to burden participants and retirees with both the
responsibility to monitor plan trustees and the consequences of
underfunding, another approach would be to have underfunding or
underperformance trigger specific, automatic tax increases at either the
state or local level, as appropriate. This is consistent with the benefit
reduction approach described above, but would place the burden on
taxpayers to monitor and challenge plan governance. It would
essentially function as a precommitment to adequately fund the plan on
an ongoing basis and invest plan assets in a manner that at least matches
investment assumptions over time. Like the benefit reduction approach,
it would begin to solve the underfunding problem immediately upon
implementation.
It is not clear that it would create a strong enough incentive for
taxpayers to monitor the pension fund. Because each taxpayer who
monitors the fund must pay the full cost of monitoring, but all taxpayers
share the benefit of monitoring, individual taxpayers may not have
enough incentive to monitor. Instead, they may rely on the automatic
tax increase to notify them that the fund has not been effectively
managed, and react to the tax increase rather than mismanagement.
However, this may place increased political pressure on the state to
effectively fund and manage its retirement system. It is interesting to
note that the only plan in our state and municipal sample that allows for
a dedicated tax to bring pension funding up to acceptable levels was a
relatively well-funded municipal plan—the City of Milwaukee
Employees’ Retirement System.

303. The ability to make prospective changes to benefits varies by state. See Amy B.
Monahan, Public Pension Plan Reform: The Legal Framework, 5 EDUC. FIN. & POL’Y 617, 638–
39 tbl.1 (2010), available at http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/EDFP_a_00014
(listing a summary of legal protections granted by each state). There are, however, arguments
that such prospective changes should be allowed absent explicit agreements to the contrary. See
Amy B. Monahan, Statutes as Contracts? The “California Rule” and Its Impact on Public
Pension Reform, 97 IOWA L. REV. 1029, 1042, 1076–79 (2012) (explaining arguments in favor
of prospective pension changes).
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3. Low-Risk Investing
Another possible solution to the public fund governance problem is
to move to a model that essentially mimics the federal employees’
retirement plan. This would involve passing strong laws that require full
funding of a plan on an annual basis and investment of plan assets in
low-risk investments such as Treasury bonds. In many ways, this
appears to be the simplest approach. It takes care of the governance
issues by taking most of the funding and investment risk out of the
equation. It does, however, require strong and enforceable funding
requirements.304 One approach might be to amend the state constitution
to provide that public pension plans receive an automatic appropriation
equal to the annual funding cost so that the legislature cannot simply
underfund the plan.
The downside of this approach is clear. It would raise the cost of
public pensions, and as a result it may not be politically viable or
fiscally viable, given that it would require states and cities to contribute
larger amounts to the plans than they currently need to fund the same
amount of benefits. Indeed, public plans historically were conservative
investors, but adopted their current equity-based investment strategies
“as a way to solve underfunding problems.”305 By eliminating securities
that have higher rates of return than investments that are considered to
be “risk free,” state and local governments will have to make larger
contributions to end up with the same amount of money to pay benefits
when they are due. Political viability aside, it is attractive in that it (1)
makes governments feel the full cost of the benefits they have offered to
employees and (2) takes away what can be politicized investment
decisions. To be fiscally viable, this solution would likely have to be
phased in over a period of years in plans that are substantially
underfunded.
4. Modified Pension Obligation Bonds
States or localities issue pension obligation bonds to cover pension
contributions. They operate like other state and local government
general obligation bonds, with a few important exceptions: in many
states they do not require voter approval and they are taxable.306
Generally, they appeal to state and local governments because they help
304. For an example of a recently enacted public pension funding provision that appears to
have both strong requirements and enforceability, see N.J. Pub. L. 2011, ch. 78, available at
http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/2010/Bills/PL11/78_.PDF.
305. Hess, supra note 11, at 194.
306. Pension Obligation Bonds were once tax-exempt, offering a much stronger arbitrage
opportunity. This was changed in the Tax Reform Act of 1986. Alicia H. Munnell et al., Pension
Obligation Bonds: Financial Crisis Exposes Risks, STATE & LOCAL PENSION PLANS (Ctr. for
Ret. Research at Bos. Coll., Bos., Mass.), Jan. 2010, at 1, 2, available at http://crr.bc.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2010/01/SLP_9-508.pdf.
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cover immediate pension costs by providing budget relief, and they pay
a relatively low interest rate because they are backed by the taxing
authority of the jurisdiction, which creates an opportunity for arbitrage.
Because pension portfolios can have a relatively higher risk/reward
tolerance than state and local governments, there is a possibility that the
money borrowed through pension obligation bonds can be invested and
earn a higher return than what the government pays to borrow. Any
additional spread made on the bonds can help defer additional pension
costs. However, research suggests most pension obligation bonds end
up costing governments more than their investments yield.307
If pension obligation bonds were tied to the performance of public
pensions, they may create a mechanism through which the market can
monitor pension funds. For example, the coupon paid on the bonds
could be tied to the pension’s realized returns, such that investors share
in gains from obtaining returns higher than those that were projected
and share in losses when returns are lower than projected.
Alternatively, pension obligation bonds could be constructed as a
reverse catastrophe bond. Insurance companies use catastrophe bonds to
help manage catastrophe risk, and will not pay part of the principal or
coupon if a predefined catastrophe occurs.308 In pension funding, the
catastrophic event may be defined as the pension reaching a specific
level of underfunding or returns falling substantially short of
projections. Instead of suspending payments of principal or interest in
the event of a catastrophe, the coupon rate could increase, which would
create an immediate and unavoidable cost for pension underfunding.
Because these would be general obligation bonds with a potential
upside for creditors, they should have lower base coupons than current
pension obligation bonds. This could make them attractive to issuers,
both state and municipal, who believe they can keep their pensions
adequately funded.
This could create an opportunity for markets to monitor pension
plans, and strong financial incentives for states and localities to
adequately fund their pensions. The adoption and use of these securities
would depend on how they are constructed and priced. Additionally, the
current market for pension obligation bonds is relatively thin, and would
need to be greatly expanded to create a meaningful market-based
monitoring mechanism for public pension funds.
CONCLUSION
While there is broad consensus that public pension plan governance
is deeply flawed, our study does not suggest that merely adopting good
governance provisions helps ensure a plan will be well funded. Based
307. Id. at 4.
308. For discussion of catastrophe risk and the use of catastrophe bonds, see generally Greg
Niehaus, The Allocation of Catastrophe Risk, 26 J. BANKING & FIN. 585 (2002).
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on the results of our study, governance in many cases becomes a
nonissue due to the lack of enforcement of governance provisions. It is
simply too easy in nearly all states and cities to ignore funding
requirements when other needs that appear to be more pressing arise.
And when investment targets are not met, plan underfunding can be
“solved” by simply raising the expected rate of return on assets and then
chasing return. In difficult economic times, political pressure can be
brought to bear so that assets that should be invested solely for
participants and beneficiaries are instead invested to try to aid a local
economy. And under the current system, the effects of these actions are
not felt for decades. If public pension plans are to succeed, it is
necessary to get serious about not only reforming plan governance but
also ensuring that there is a reliable method to enforce plan-funding
requirements grounded in realistic assumptions.
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